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The President’s Power To Tax 
 
Daniel J. Hemel* 
 
102 Cornell Law Review (forthcoming 2016) 
 
[DRAFT — August 15, 2016] 
 
 
 
 Existing statutes give the President and his Treasury Department 
broad authority to implement important elements of the administration’s 
tax agenda without further congressional action. And yet only 
infrequently does the Executive Branch exercise this statutory “power to 
tax.” Instead, the President often asks Congress to pass revenue-raising 
measures achieving what the President and his Treasury Department 
already could accomplish on their own. And even when Congress rebuffs 
the President’s request, present and past administrations only rarely have 
responded by exercising the regulatory authority they already possess. 
Contrast this with the fact that present and past Presidents have stretched 
the limits of executive authority in a taxpayer-friendly direction—even 
over Congress’s expressed preferences.  
 This article attempts to explain the peculiar patterns of executive 
action and inaction observed in the tax policymaking domain. It draws 
on public choice theory and game theory to build a strategic model of 
interactions between the Executive and Legislative Branches. The model 
generates several counterintuitive implications. Among others: a strong 
anti-tax faction in Congress may increase the probability that revenue-
raising regulatory measures are implemented; judicial deference to 
Treasury regulations may reduce lawmakers’ willingness to pass revenue-
raising fixes to existing tax statutes; and statutory rules requiring 
legislation to be “deficit-neutral” may discourage the administration from 
taking deficit-closing regulatory actions.  
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Introduction 
 
 In April 2016, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew announced new temporary 
regulations making it more difficult for a foreign company to acquire a larger 
American company without triggering the adverse tax consequences of an 
“inversion.” 1  At the same time, Treasury published proposed regulations 
addressing so-called “earnings stripping” transactions that shift corporate profits 
from the United States to lower tax jurisdictions; the proposed rules characterize 
certain interests as stock instead of indebtedness to prevent U.S. corporations from 
claiming interest deductions on payments to their foreign affiliates.2 President 
Obama told reporters at a White House press conference the following day that 
he “wanted to make sure that we highlighted the importance of Treasury’s 
action.” He also used the occasion as an opportunity to lambaste lawmakers for 
their inaction on inversions. “I want to be clear,” President Obama said. “While 
the Treasury Department actions will make it more difficult and less lucrative for 
companies to exploit this particular corporate inversions loophole, only Congress 
can close it for good, and only Congress can make sure that all the other loopholes 
that are being taken advantage of are closed. . . . So far, Republicans in Congress 
have yet to act.”3 
 Reaction was swift. Hours after the President’s press conference, news 
leaked that the pharmaceutical giant Pfizer had called off its plans to merge with 
the Irish-headquartered Allergan—a transaction that was initially structured to 
avoid the inversion rules but that would have been caught up in the new 
temporary regulations’ sweep.4 Pfizer’s chief executive officer, Ian Read, took to 
the op-ed page of the Wall Street Journal to assail the Obama administration’s “ad 
hoc and arbitrary” action as “unprecedented, unproductive, and harmful to the 
U.S. economy.”5 Inches away, the Journal’s editorial board said that Treasury’s 
“rewrite of longstanding U.S. tax law” was “lawless” and “would almost surely be 
thrown out if it were challenged in court.” Defending Pfizer and other firms 
involved in transactions targeted by the new rules, the Journal board said that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Additional Action to Curb 
Inversions, Address Earnings Stripping (Apr. 4, 2016), available at 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0405.aspx; Inversions and Related 
Transactions: Final and Temporary Regulations, Treas. Dec. 9761, 81 Fed. Reg. 20858 (Apr. 8, 
2016). 
2 Treatment of Certain Interests in Corporations as Stock or Indebtedness: Proposed Rule, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 20912 (Apr. 8, 2016). 
3 White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Transcript, Remarks by the President on the Economy 
(Apr. 5, 2016), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/05/remarks-
president-economy-0. 
4 Michael J. de la Merced & Leslie Picker, Pfizer and Allergan Are Said To End Merger as Tax 
Rules Tighten, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/business/dealbook/tax-inversion-obama-treasury.html. 
5 Ian Read, Op-Ed, Treasury Is Wrong About Our Merger and Growth, Wall St. J., Apr. 6, 2016, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/treasury-is-wrong-about-our-merger-and-growth-1459983997. 
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“these companies are acting legally and behaving rationally under the law that 
Congress has written.”6 
 In fact, the laws that Congress has written delegate broad power to the 
Treasury Department to take the sorts of actions that President Obama and 
Secretary Lew announced in April. Section 7874 of the Internal Revenue Code, 
which addresses inversions, authorizes the Treasury Secretary to promulgate 
“regulations providing for such adjustments to the application of this section as 
are necessary to prevent the avoidance of the purposes of this section.”7 Section 
385, the statute that Treasury invoked in its earnings stripping proposal, 
authorizes the Treasury Secretary “to prescribe such regulations as may be 
necessary or appropriate to determine whether an interest in a corporation is to be 
treated for purposes of this title as stock or indebtedness.”8 On the one hand, these 
statutory provisions undermine President Obama’s claim that Congress has failed 
to take action against inversions: a Republican-led Congress did act in 2004 by 
passing section 7874, which gave the Treasury Secretary the power to close 
loopholes. 9  (A Democratic-majority Congress also acted in 1969 by passing 
section 385, although it is doubtful that inversions were on anyone’s mind at the 
time.10) On the other hand, these statutory provisions also undermine the Wall 
Street Journal editorial board’s claim that the Obama administration is 
“rewrit[ing]” the tax laws. The laws themselves give the administration wide 
leeway to define the rules of the game. 
 But in at least one sense, Pfizer’s CEO was quite right to say that the 
Obama administration’s approach was “unprecedented”—or close to it. (I will 
leave it to others to assess Ian Read’s claims that the April 2016 actions were 
“unproductive” and “harmful to the U.S. economy”;11 my goal here is not to 
explore the merits of the administration’s actions but instead to focus on the form 
those actions took.) Rarely, if ever, has a President publicly taken ownership of a 
tax-related Treasury decision, much less a decision that moved the dial in a 
taxpayer-unfriendly direction.12 In this respect, the Obama administration’s April 
2016 actions on inversions and earnings stripping were indeed 
“unprecedented”—or, more precisely, unprecedented in the history of tax policy. 
 Of course, presidential administrations oftentimes take unilateral action in 
areas other than tax, and Presidents oftentimes take personal and political 
ownership of such measures. The Obama administration also has used regulatory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Review & Outlook, Jack Lew’s Corporate Tax Ambush, Wall St. J., Apr. 6, 2016, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/jack-lews-corporate-tax-ambush-1459900261. 
7 26 U.S.C. § 7874(g). 
8 § 385(a). 
9 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 801(a), 118 Stat. 1562. 
10 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 415(a), 83 Stat. 613. 
11 Compare, e.g., Editorial, A Corporate Tax Dodge Gets Harder, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/opinion/a-corporate-tax-dodge-gets-harder.html, with 
Diana Furchtgott-Roth, Op-Ed, Free Pfizer! Why Inversions Are Good for the U.S., N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 7, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/08/opinion/free-pfizer-why-inversions-are-
good-for-the-us.html. 
12 In conversations with the author, Treasury officials from the past six administrations could name 
no similar example of a President claiming credit for a revenue-raising regulatory measure.  
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authority to double fuel economy standards for cars and light-duty trucks,13 to 
implement “common-sense” gun safety measures,14 to ban “trans fat” from most 
food products,15  to restrict carbon emissions from power plants,16  to extend 
overtime pay to millions more workers,17 and to grant “deferred action” status to 
hundreds of thousands of undocumented immigrants who came to the United 
States as children.18 (The carbon emissions regulations have been stayed by the 
Supreme Court,19 and the Justices by a 4-4 vote recently affirmed a lower court 
decision striking down the deferred action expansion.20) The administration of 
George W. Bush, for its part, used its regulatory authority with particular vigor in 
the waning days of Bush’s second term, acting to ease rules on strip mining and 
coal power plant construction, open millions of acres to oil shale drilling, and 
allow individuals to carry concealed and loaded weapons in national parks, among 
other measures. 21  The Clinton administration acted unilaterally to outlaw 
smoking in federal buildings, ban the importation of dozens of types of 
semiautomatic weapons, and turn millions of acres in the West and Southwest 
into national monuments, among other measures.22 Indeed, at the end of the 
Clinton years then-professor Elena Kagan already could declare that “[w]e live 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Obama Administration Finalizes Historic 
54.5 MPG Fuel Efficiency Standards (Aug. 28, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/08/28/obama-administration-finalizes-historic-545-mpg-fuel-efficiency-standard. 
14 White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: New Executive Actions to Reduce Gun 
Violence and Make Our Communities Safer (Jan. 4, 2016), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/04/fact-sheet-new-executive-actions-
reduce-gun-violence-and-make-our. Among other measures, the President announced that the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms would finalize a rule requiring background checks for 
additional gun purchases; the Social Security Administration would begin a rulemaking process 
with the goal of allowing mental health information regarding beneficiaries to be incorporated into 
the background check system; and the Department of Health and Human Services would finalize 
a rule amending privacy protections under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA) so that state health officials could share mental health records of potential gun 
purchasers with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
15 Final Determination Regarding Partially Hydrogenated Oils, 80 Fed. Reg. 34650 (June 17, 
2015). 
16 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units—Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015).  
17 See Jonelle Marte, Millions More Workers Will Be Eligible for Overtime Pay Under New 
Federal Rule, Wash. Post, May 18, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/get-
there/wp/2016/05/17/millions-more-workers-would-be-eligible-for-overtime-pay-under-new-
federal-rule (noting that President Obama would announce the new rules alongside his Labor 
Secretary). 
18 Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar et 
al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United 
States as Children (June 15, 2012), available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-
exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf. 
19 See West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15A773, 577 U.S. __ (Feb. 9, 2016). 
20 See United States v. Texas, 579 U.S. __ (June 23, 2016). 
21 Paul  Harris, Bush Sneaks Through Host of Laws To Undermine Obama, The Guardian 
(London), Dec. 13, 2008, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/dec/14/george-bush-
midnight-regulations. 
22 See William G. Howell, Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action __ 
(2003). 
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today in an era of presidential administration,”23 and her claim is—if anything—
truer today than it was a decade and a half ago. 
 Tax, though, has followed a somewhat different pattern. Rather than 
acting on their own or through their Treasury Secretaries, the past three 
Presidents have repeatedly asked Congress to close “loopholes”24 in the tax laws—
even when existing statutes gave them ample (or at least arguable) authority to 
enact a desired change, and even when legislative gridlock made it exceedingly 
unlikely that Congress would act. Each year, each President since George H.W. 
Bush has presented a set of suggested tax law reforms to Congress—compiled in a 
single volume colloquially known as the “Greenbook” because of its distinctive 
green cover.25 Almost invariably, the Greenbook includes proposals that the 
President plausibly could carry out on his own—without any congressional 
action—by directing the Treasury Department to promulgate appropriate 
regulations. Recent examples include: 
 
• Requiring managers of private equity, venture capital, and hedge funds to 
pay tax on carried interest profits at ordinary income rates rather than 
capital gains rates;26 
• Restricting the use of “check-the-box” rules to create stateless income;27 
• Preventing oil and gas companies and other taxpayers from claiming 
foreign tax credits where the relevant foreign country imposes no general 
tax;28  
• Repealing the lower-of-cost-or-market (LCM) inventory accounting 
method;29  
• Preventing taxpayers from avoiding gift taxes through “zeroed-out” 
grantor retained annuity trusts (GRATs);30  
• Disallowing deductions for “charitable” contributions of rights to airspace 
above historic homes;31 and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2246 (2001). 
24 As Joseph Pechman noted, “A provision regarded as a loophole for one group is often justified as 
a major improvement in equity or as essential to promote economic growth by another.” Joseph A. 
Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 63, 66-67 (1967). 
This article avoids the term from here on out. 
25 Greenbooks from fiscal year 1990 to the present are available at U.S. Dep’t of Treas., 
Administration’s Fiscal Year Revenue Proposals, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/Pages/general_explanation.aspx (last updated Mar. 3, 2016). The Greenbook is not to be 
confused with the Bluebook, which is prepared by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation at 
the end of each Congress and which explains all tax provisions actually enacted during the 
previous congressional session. See Joint Committee Bluebooks, Joint Comm. on Tax’n, 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=select&id=9 (last visited Dec. 11, 2015). 
 Complicating matters somewhat, the administration of George W. Bush used a blue 
cover for its books of revenue proposals. See Warren Rojas, Bush Tax Credit Aims To Make 
Housing Dreams Come True, Tax Notes, Apr. 16, 2001, p. 375. The Obama administration 
restored the cover to the color green. See Tim Tuerff et al., Obama Proposals Would Topple 
Long-Standing Tax Framework, Tax Notes Int’l, May 25, 2009, p. 657. 
26 See infra Section I.E.1. 
27 See infra Section I.E.2. 
28 See infra Section I.E.3. 
29 See infra Section I.E.4. 
30 See infra Section I.E.5. 
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• Denying a deduction for payment of punitive damages.32  
 
 Several of these measures have appeared in multiple years’ Greenbooks: 
the proposal to eliminate the carried interest preference, for example, appeared in 
the Greenbook every year of the Obama administration. 33  Year after year, 
Congress rebuffed the President’s request.34 Surely by the last year of the Obama 
administration, Treasury officials harbored no illusions that Congress would pass 
these measures. Why did the administration not act on its own? 
 To be sure, if the Executive Branch acted alone to implement these tax 
law changes, its actions would likely face challenge in court. On some of the above 
issues (e.g., limiting the ability of oil, gas, and other companies to claim foreign tax 
credits where no foreign tax was paid), the administration would almost certainly 
prevail; on other issues (e.g., carried interest and punitive damages) the 
administration’s authority is somewhat less clear. And yet the risk of litigation 
hardly explains the Obama administration’s reluctance to act on its own: after all, 
the administration routinely faces (and sometimes loses) challenges to unilateral 
action in other areas, ranging from immigration35 to air pollution36 to corporate 
governance.37 What explains the reluctance of this and past administrations to 
raise revenue via executive action when the path to legislative reform was 
obstructed?  
  This article offers a first cut at answering that question. I say it is a “first 
cut” because the question has thus far gone almost entirely unasked.38 While 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See infra Section I.E.6. 
32 See infra Section I.E.7. 
33 See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2010 
Revenue Proposals 23-24 (May 2009) [hereinafter FY 2010 Greenbook]; U.S. Dep’t of the 
Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2011 Revenue Proposals 91-
92 (Feb. 2010) [hereinafter FY 2011 Greenbook]; U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, General 
Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2012 Revenue Proposals 61-62 (Feb. 2011) 
[hereinafter FY 2012 Greenbook]; U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, General Explanations of the 
Administration’s Fiscal Year 2013 Revenue Proposals 134-35 (Feb. 2012) [hereinafter FY 2013 
Greenbook]; U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 
2014 Revenue Proposals 159-60 (Apr. 2013) [hereinafter FY 2014 Greenbook]; U.S. Dep’t of the 
Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2015 Revenue Proposals 177-
78 (Mar. 2014) [hereinafter FY 2015 Greenbook]; U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, General 
Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2016 Revenue Proposals 163-64 (Feb. 2015) 
[hereinafter FY 2016 Greenbook]; U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, General Explanations of the 
Administration’s Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals 162-63 (Feb. 2016) [hereinafter FY 2017 
Greenbook]. 
34 See Jackie Calmes, Carried-Interest Tax Break Divides Again, After Trump Revives the Issue, 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/19/business/carried-interest-tax-
break-divides-again-after-trump-revives-the-issue.html. 
35 See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016). 
36 See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
37 See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
38 Daniel Berman and Victoria Haneman briefly address the question in their otherwise-
comprehensive overview of tax policymaking. See Daniel M. Berman and Victoria J. Haneman, 
Making Tax Law 196 (2014) (“[W]hy would the Administration submit a legislative proposal to 
override regulations issued by its own Treasury Department, when the Treasury Department 
could simply and quickly change the regulations on its own?”). Berman and Haneman suggest that 
the answer has to do with the fact that “[n]either the Joint Committee on Taxation nor the 
Treasury Department prepares a revenue estimate for a proposed regulation.” So while “the 
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others have noted that the administration likely could end the carried interest 
preference without Congress,39 this article shows that the carried interest example 
is part of a larger pattern. Recent Greenbooks are replete with proposals that 
could be accomplished by regulation: in many cases, the President asks Congress 
to fix a flaw created by Treasury rules—rules which the administration has 
authority to repeal. 40  Moreover, this pattern is not specific to the Obama 
administration: a review of Greenbooks since 1990 turns up numerous examples 
in which the President has asked Congress to do what his administration could do 
on its own.41  
 Part I of the article lays out the legal and institutional landscape. Part II 
offers several possible reasons why a President and his administration might 
decline to pursue revenue-raising regulatory measures—even when the same 
President supports legislation that would accomplish the same result. I start with a 
rudimentary model in which politicians take actions when the political costs 
exceed the political benefits. I then complicate the model by envisioning two 
actors—the President and Congress—whose political fortunes are separate. 
Voters and interest groups allocate credit and blame between the President and 
Congress based on each actor’s role in the policymaking process: when the 
Executive Branch acts unilaterally, the President reaps all the credit but bears all 
the blame; when Congress passes legislation that the President signs, Congress and 
the President share credit and blame proportionally. I add the additional 
constraint that the President cannot spend government funds on his own; all 
appropriations legislation must go through Congress. With this additional 
constraint, the two-branch model suggests an asymmetry between non-tax and tax 
matters. On the non-tax side, any policy that the President is willing to sign into 
law is also a policy that he would implement via regulation—i.e., any policy for 
which the political benefits exceed the political costs. On the tax side, however, 
the President bears all the political costs of executive actions that raise revenue but 
shares the political benefits of additional spending with Congress. The model 
predicts that there will be some revenue-raising measures that the President would 
sign if they came to his desk in the form of legislation (because he would then 
share the political costs with Congress) but that he would not want to implement 
via regulation (because he would then bear the political costs all himself). The 
model also predicts an additional asymmetry within tax law: the President will be 
less willing to promulgate (or to instruct his Treasury Secretary to promulgate) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Treasury Department has the authority to simply revise or revoke regulations,” Berman and 
Haneman posit that “the Administration may want to capture the measurable increase in 
revenue . . . and to do so, the change or revocation must be enacted by statute.” Id. 
 Berman and Haneman’s explanation is illuminating but incomplete. The Treasury 
Department could solve the problem identified by Berman and Haneman by generating its own 
revenue estimates for regulations. (Indeed, Treasury already estimates the revenue effects of each 
legislative proposal in the Greenbook.) The fact that Treasury refrains from estimating the revenue 
effects of regulations may be a consequence of its reluctance to implement revenue-raising 
regulations sua sponte; but given that Treasury could easily reverse this policy, it is difficult to see 
how the lack of revenue estimates for regulations could play a significant causal role.  
39 See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty Revisited: Taxing Carried Interest as Ordinary 
Income Through Executive Action Instead of Legislation (unpublished manuscript). 
40 See infra notes 101, 120-129, 133-135, 142-145, and accompanying text. 
41 See infra notes 136-137, 144, 194, 200, 208, and accompanying text. 
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regulations that increase tax revenue than to promulgate regulations that reduce 
tax revenue. Indeed, the prospect of promulgating regulations that reduce revenue 
will be quite attractive to the President: if his administration acts on its own to 
reduce taxes, the President will reap all the political benefits, while he and 
Congress will share the political costs of spending cuts.  
 The rudimentary model yields a partial explanation for patterns of 
presidential action (and inaction) in the tax domain, but the account is incomplete 
in several respects. For one, the model envisions a single decisionmaker (the 
President) making a one-time decision (whether to promulgate regulations or 
request legislation). More realistically, outcomes are the product of strategic 
interactions between the Executive and Legislative Branches across a range of tax 
law issues. A game-theoretic model helps to describe these interactions. The 
President decides whether or not to regulate, and Congress decides whether or not 
to legislate. All else equal, the President would prefer to share the political costs of 
raising revenue with Congress, while Congress would prefer that the President 
bear all the political costs of raising revenue himself. 
 The game-theoretic model yields a number of additional implications. 
First, the model suggests that the President may ask Congress to pass revenue-
raising legislative proposals even when the political costs to the President of 
implementing the proposal via regulation are less than his portion of the shared 
political benefits from additional spending. In more colloquial terms, the President 
may ask Congress to share the dirty work of raising revenue even though, push 
comes to shove, the administration would be willing to act on its own. Second, 
and symmetrically, the model suggests that Congress may rebuff the President’s 
requests for revenue-raising legislation even when Congress’s share of the political 
costs of raising revenue is less than Congress’s share of the political benefits from 
the additional spending that revenue-raising would allow. In other words, 
members of Congress may try to call the President’s bluff—they may reject the 
President’s recommendations for revenue-raising legislation in the hope that if 
they do not act, the Executive Branch will proceed on its own. In his ideal world, 
the President could credibly commit not to implement certain revenue-raising 
regulations, thus spurring Congress to act. And in its ideal world, Congress could 
credibly commit not to pass certain revenue-raising measures, thus spurring the 
President to act on his own. Absent the possibility of such credible commitments, 
however, some revenue-raising measures that could be implemented via 
regulation or via legislation may not be implemented at all. 
  Part II goes on to discuss further implications of the game-theoretic 
model. First, I consider the role of ideology in bargaining between the President 
and Congress. If the political costs of revenue-raising measures are higher for 
Republicans than for Democrats, divided government will affect bargaining 
outcomes. When the President is a Democrat and Congress is controlled by 
Republicans, the Democratic President will discount the probability of revenue-
raising legislative action; accordingly, the Democratic President may be more 
willing to raise revenue unilaterally. Meanwhile, when the President is a 
Republican and Congress is controlled by Democrats, then the President will 
assign a higher value to the probability of revenue-raising legislation, and 
Congress will discount the probability of unilateral executive action. Perhaps a 
more surprising implication is that a wider divergence between the President’s 
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preferences and Congress’s does not necessarily increase the probability of a 
bargaining breakdown, because Presidents will be more willing to raise revenue 
unilaterally when Congress is strongly tax-averse, and Congress will be more 
willing to pass revenue-raising legislation when the President is strongly tax-
averse. 
 Next, I examine the role of doctrine in defining the terms of interactions 
between the President and Congress. Judicial deference to the Executive Branch’s 
interpretations of tax statutes will, intuitively, expand the universe of revenue-
raising measures that the Executive Branch can implement on its own. Less 
intuitively, judicial deference may make Congress more reluctant to adopt 
revenue-raising legislation: after all, Congress would prefer not to bear the 
political costs of revenue-raising measures if it does not have to. The latter 
observation suggests that the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo Foundation, to the 
extent that it increased judicial deference to Treasury regulations, may have been 
a double-edged sword: Mayo Foundation empowered the Executive Branch to act 
unilaterally, but it also may have increased the probability of a bargaining 
breakdown. 
 Part II then considers the role of congressional “deficit hawks” in the tax 
policymaking process. I assume that some members of Congress are reluctant to 
vote for legislation unless it is revenue neutral. (Congress has periodically adopted 
“PAYGO” rules that attempt to codify this revenue neutrality constraint.) 
PAYGO has the potential to discourage the Executive Branch from adopting a 
revenue-raising measure on its own, because by doing so, it loses the ability to 
include those revenue raisers in legislation as offsets for the expenditures or tax 
cuts that the President supports. The irony is that lawmakers’ emphasis on 
revenue neutrality may discourage the Executive Branch from pursuing 
regulatory actions that would raise revenue and reduce the deficit. The article 
thus draws attention to a potential unintended consequence of PAYGO rules.  
 Having previewed the aims of the article, I should add a word about what 
the article does not aspire to do. This article does not seek to offer a 
comprehensive account of the regulatory or legislative process in tax law.42 
Rather, my objective is to present a model of strategic interactions between the 
Executive Branch and Congress on tax matters and to derive testable hypotheses 
from the model. I also attempt to show that the strategic model helps to explain 
some puzzling aspects of tax policymaking. But it is far from a full explanation.43  
 
I. The President’s (Largely Latent) Power To Tax  
 
A. Presidential Administration Outside of Tax 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 For one such account, see Berman & Haneman, supra note 38. 
43 See generally Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics 7 (1979) (“Explanatory 
power . . . is gained by moving away from ‘reality,’ not by staying close to it. A full description 
would be of the least explanatory power. . . . Departing from reality is not necessarily good, but 
unless one can do so in some clever way, one can only describe and not explain.”). 
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 The President wields broad power to pursue policy objectives via executive 
action. 44 One source of presidential power is the Constitution’s Appointments 
Clause, which requires all principal executive officers of the United States to be 
appointed by the President (with the Senate’s advice and consent). 45  The 
Appointments Clause generally allows the President to choose agency heads who 
share his policy preferences (though, to be sure, this mechanism of presidential 
control may break down when Congress repeatedly refuses to confirm the 
President’s nominees). A second source of presidential power arises from his 
removal authority: as a general rule, the President may fire executive officers who 
disobey his commands.46 The Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the 
general rule where Congress has “conferr[ed] good-cause tenure on the principal 
officers of certain independent agencies”; the Federal Trade Commission is one 
example.47 However, the President has the power to fire any Cabinet secretary at 
will. Past Presidents have exercised this power relatively rarely, but the firing of a 
Cabinet secretary is not an unheard-of occurrence.48 Moreover, Executive Branch 
officials labor in the shadow of the President’s removal power: the President’s 
authority to fire his underlings may have a significant effect on their conduct even 
if firings are infrequent. 
 Beyond controlling the identities of agency heads, Presidents also pursue 
policy objectives by issuing executive orders and presidential memoranda 
directing Executive Branch officials to take specific actions. 49  Often these 
directives instruct Cabinet secretaries or other agency heads to promulgate 
particular regulations. Examples of recent presidential memoranda from President 
Obama include: a memorandum instructing the Secretary of Defense, Attorney 
General, and Secretary of Homeland Security to conduct and sponsor research 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The phrase “executive action” does not refer to a “special legal category.” It is, as Eric Posner 
puts it, “more like a layman’s term for anything the executive branch does.” See Julie Percha, The 
Nuance You May Have Missed in Obama’s Gun Control Plan, PBS NewsHour (Jan. 5, 2016), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/whats-the-difference-between-an-executive-order-and-
action (quoting Posner). The term “executive order” does appear in the U.S. Code: the Federal 
Register Act requires publication of most “executive orders” in the Federal Register (though 
executive orders need not be published if they lack “general applicability and legal effect” or if they 
are effective only against federal officials). See 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a). As a practical matter, though, 
many presidential pronouncements that are not labeled “executive order” nonetheless appear in 
the Federal Register, and many executive orders appear in the Federal Register even though they 
technically fall within one of § 1505(a)’s exceptions. A recent report from the Congressional 
Research Service observes that “[t]he distinction between these instruments—executive orders, 
presidential memoranda, and proclamations—seems to be more a matter of form than of 
substance,” given that any such document “may be employed to direct the actions of government 
officials and agencies.” Vivian S. Chu & Todd Garvey, Cong. Research Serv., Executive Orders: 
Issuance Modification, and Revocation 2 (Apr. 16, 2014). This article will use the term “executive 
action” throughout to refer to actions by the Secretary of the Treasury and other administration 
officials to implement the President’s policies. 
45 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 
130 S. Ct. 3138, 3149 (2010). 
46 See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3151-52. 
47 Id., at 3152; Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
48 See, e.g., Firing of Presidential Cabinet Members a Rarity, NPR: All Things Considered (Dec. 
15, 2013), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=251330321. 
49 See Kagan, supra note 23, at 2993-99. On the distinction (or lack thereof) between executive 
orders and presidential memoranda, see supra note 44. 
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into gun safety technology that will reduce the risk of accidental discharge or 
unauthorized use of firearms and that will improve the tracing of lost and stolen 
guns;50 a memorandum requiring that federally employed physicians undergo 
training regarding prescription opioid paid medication misuse;51 a memorandum 
instructing the Secretary of Education to propose regulations allowing certain 
borrowers to cap their federal student loan payments at 10% of income;52 a 
memorandum instructing the Secretary of Labor to propose regulations 
expanding overtime protections for workers in the private and public sectors;53 
and a memorandum instructing the EPA Administrator to issue a final rule setting 
standards for greenhouse gas emissions from power plants.54 While President 
Obama has issued memoranda to agencies more frequently than his predecessors, 
he is not the first chief executive to use such memoranda as a means of pursuing 
policy objectives.55 Then-Professor Kagan noted that the Clinton administration 
was a turning point in the use of presidential memoranda to catalyze agency 
action: by her count, President Reagan issued 9 directives to heads of domestic 
policy agencies regarding substantive regulatory policy; the first President Bush 
issued 4 such directives; President Clinton issued 107.56 (According to another 
tally, the second President Bush issued approximately 150 during his two terms 
and President Obama had reached the 200 mark by the end of his first six years in 
office.57) 
 Presidents also exercise power over executive agencies through a formal 
process of “presidential review” of proposed regulations.58 Every President since 
Reagan has required agencies to submit all proposed rules to the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, a part of the Office of Management and 
Budget within the White House. Agencies also must submit a “regulatory impact 
analysis” accompanying any rule that is “major” or “significant,” with “major” or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Memorandum—Promoting Smart Gun Technology (Jan. 4, 2016), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/05/memorandum-promoting-smart-gun-
technology. 
51 Presidential Memorandum—Addressing Prescription Drug Abuse and Heroin Abuse (Oct. 21, 
2015), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/21/presidential-
memorandum-addressing-prescription-drug-abuse-and-heroin. 
52 Presidential Memorandum—Federal Student Loan Repayments (June 9, 2014), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/09/presidential-memorandum-federal-
student-loan-repayments. 
53 Presidential Memorandum—Updating and Modernizing Overtime Regulations (Mar. 13, 
2014), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/13/presidential-
memorandum-updating-and-modernizing-overtime-regulations. 
54 Presidential Memorandum—Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards (June 25, 2013), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/presidential-memorandum-power-
sector-carbon-pollution-standards. 
55 See Kenneth S. Lowande, After the Orders: Presidential Memoranda and Unilateral Action, 44 
Pres. Stud. Q. 724, 730 fig. 1 (2014). 
56 Kagan, supra note 23, at 2294.  
57 See Gregory Korte, Obama Issues ‘Executive Orders by Another Name,’ USA Today, Dec. 17, 
2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/12/16/obama-presidential-
memoranda-executive-orders/20191805; White House, Presidential Memoranda, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/presidential-memoranda (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2016). 
58 See Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1755, 
1767 (2013). 
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“significant” defined to include rules likely to result in an “annual effect on the 
economy of $100 million or more.”59 That analysis generally (but not always) 
involves some quantification of the regulation’s costs and benefits.60 If OIRA 
determines that a proposed rule is not cost-justified, OIRA “returns” the rule to 
the agency for further consideration.61 Recent Presidents have used the OIRA 
review process to block regulations that diverged from their policy objectives. In 
September 2011, President Obama “requested” that the EPA Administrator 
withdraw draft rules setting national ambient air quality standards for ozone.62 
(The EPA Administrator, who serves at the President’s pleasure, unsurprisingly 
complied with the request.) For its part, the administration of George W. Bush 
“returned” 42 rules to the agency after OIRA review.63 
 Once a rule passes through the OIRA review process and is promulgated 
by an agency, it still may be challenged in the courts. Judicial review of agency 
regulations interpreting statutes is generally governed by the two-step Chevron 
framework. Under Chevron, the court first determines “whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue” in the relevant statute.64 If yes, 
then Congress’s unambiguous statement is controlling. Conversely, “if the statute 
is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court 
is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute”—or, phrased differently, whether the agency arrived at a “reasonable 
interpretation.”65 
 The Chevron framework is no doubt familiar to most readers, and I will not 
pause here to comment on its various exceptions and limits.66 The key takeaways 
from the discussion of presidential administration outside of tax are as follows: 
The President can pursue his policy objectives by appointing loyal agency heads 
and removing disloyal ones, by directing agencies to take specific actions such as 
promulgating regulations, and by blocking agencies from issuing regulations that 
diverge from his agenda. Moreover, when an executive agency does issue a 
regulation interpreting a statute, that regulation is (at least as a doctrinal matter) 
generally reviewed under the deferential Chevron framework. This is true even 
when the regulation reverses the view adopted by a previous administration (or 
adopted previously by the same administration).67 To be sure, the President also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 1(b) (1982) (revoked 1993); Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 2(f)(1) 
(1993). 
60 See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and Bayesian Cost-Benefit 
Analysis (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., Public Law Working Paper No. 538, Aug. 17, 2015), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2646063. 
61 Exec. Order 12866, § 6(b)(3) (Sept. 30, 1993). 
62 White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the President on the Ozone National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards (Sept. 2, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/09/02/statement-president-ozone-national-ambient-air-quality-standards. 
63 Nina Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decisions, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1127, 
1150 (2010). 
64 Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
65 Id. at 843, 844.  
66 For a more comprehensive treatment, see generally Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, 
Chevron’s Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833 (2000). 
67 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm’cns Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) 
(“Agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s interpretation under the 
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can pursue his policy goals by submitting legislative proposals to Congress and by 
using his “bully pulpit” to put pressure on Congress for action.68 And, of course, 
he has the power to veto legislation at odds with his own preferences. But 
Presidents can—and do—carry out significant elements of their agenda on their 
own, without congressional participation. 
 
B. Presidential Administration and Tax Law 
 
 Formally, the President’s powers with respect to tax law look very similar 
to his powers in most other areas. Both the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue serve at the pleasure of the President: he 
appoints them (with the advice and consent of Congress), and can remove them at 
will.69 The same is true for the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy 
and the IRS Chief Counsel, the officials most directly responsible for drafting 
regulations that interpret the Internal Revenue Code.70 The Constitution also 
imposes no constraints on Congress’s ability to delegate authority to the Executive 
Branch in tax law beyond the constraints that apply in other areas. (The 
Origination Clause constrains Congress with regard to revenue measures,71 but 
the Supreme Court has said that the Origination Clause does not affect the ability 
of Congress to delegate authority to the President regarding tax matters. 72) And at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Chevron framework. . . . [T]he whole point of Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the 
ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
68 See generally George C. Edwards III & B. Dan Wood, Who Influences Whom? The President, 
Congress, and the Media, 93 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 327 (2014). 
69 President George W. Bush’s first Treasury Secretary, Paul O’Neill, technically “resigned” but by 
almost all accounts “was fired.” See Edmund L. Andrews, Bush, in Shake-Up of Cabinet, Ousts 
Treasury Leader, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 2002, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/07/politics/07ONEI.html; John F. Dickerson, Confessions of 
a White House Insider, Time (Jan. 10, 2004), 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,574809,00.html. 
70 On the role of the Assistant Secretary and the IRS Chief Counsel in the regulatory process, see 
Internal Revenue Manual § 32.1.6.9 (2016). See also 26 U.S.C. § 7803 (providing for presidential 
appointment and removal of the IRS Chief Counsel, with the IRS Commissioner providing 
recommendations to the President on both points). 
71 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (“All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of 
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills.”). In 
practice, the Origination Clause rarely imposes a binding constraint: “With increasing frequency, 
the Senate takes a revenue bill passed by the House (the ‘shell bill’), strikes the language of the bill 
entirely, and replaces it with its own revenue bill unrelated to the one that began in the House.” 
Rebecca M. Kysar, 91 Wash. U. L. Rev. 659, 661 (2014). So far this “shell bill” maneuver has 
passed muster in federal court. See id. at 662 n.10. 
72 A unanimous Court addressed this issue in Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co.: 
 
We discern nothing in [the structure of Article I] that would distinguish Congress’ power 
to tax from its other enumerated powers—such as its commerce powers, its power to 
“raise and support Armies,” its power to borrow money, or its power to “make Rules for 
the Government”—in terms of the scope and degree of discretionary authority that 
Congress may delegate to the Executive in order that the President may “take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed.” It is, of course, true that “all Bills for raising Revenue 
must originate in the House of Representatives.” But the Origination Clause . . . implies 
nothing about the scope of Congress’ power to delegate discretionary authority under its 
taxing power once a tax bill has been properly enacted. . . . We find no support . . . for 
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least in theory, the President can exercise the same authority with respect to the 
Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service through memoranda and 
return letters as he can with respect to other Cabinet agencies and sub-agencies. 
Here, however, theory and practice diverge: It does not appear that the President 
has ever issued a memorandum directing Treasury or the IRS to take regulatory 
action on a tax-specific issue,73 and none of the OIRA return letters (or, at least, 
none of the publicly disclosed return letters) relate to tax regulations. 
Furthermore, the IRS maintains that tax-related regulations are exempt from the 
requirements of Executive Order 12866, which sets forth the details of the 
presidential review process.74  
 The IRS’s exemption claim is questionable. The Service says that “[m]ost 
IRS/Treasury regulations are not significant regulatory actions for two key 
reasons.” The first reason is that “the economic effect of a regulation under 
[Executive Order] 12866 is not determined by the amount of taxes imposed or 
collected under the regulation.” The second is that “most IRS/Treasury 
regulations merely implement a statute”; thus, “[t]he effect from a rule in most 
IRS/Treasury regulations is almost always a result of the underlying statute, 
rather than the regulation itself.”75 Neither assertion holds up under scrutiny.  
 The IRS’s first point seems to rely on the notion that an agency, in 
calculating the “annual effect on the economy” of a proposed regulation, ought 
not include revenues raised. To be sure, if a regulation requires one party to 
transfer $100 million to another, the $100 million should not be considered a net 
benefit or a net cost for purposes of cost-benefit analysis.76 But OIRA has clearly 
stated that the “annual effect on the economy” calculation “includes benefits, costs, 
or transfers.” 77  Other agencies routinely include transfers when calculating a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[the] contention that the text of the Constitution or the practices of Congress require the 
application of a different and stricter nondelegation doctrine in cases where Congress 
delegates discretionary authority to the Executive under its taxing power. . . . Congress 
may wisely choose to be more circumspect in delegating authority under the Taxing 
Clause than under other of its enumerated powers, but this is not a heightened degree of 
prudence required by the Constitution. 
 
490 U.S. 212, 220-23 (1989) (alterations and citations omitted). 
73 President Obama has issued one memorandum addressed to the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, although the memo did not direct the Commissioner to take regulatory action. Rather, 
the memo responded to reports from the Government Accountability Office indicating that tens of 
thousands of federal contractors had failed to pay their federal taxes. See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t 
Accountability Office, GAO-07-742T, Tax Compliance: Thousands of Federal Contractors Abuse 
the Federal Tax System (Apr. 19, 2007), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07742t.pdf. The memo directed the Commissioner to “conduct 
a review of certifications of non-delinquency in taxes that companies bidding for Federal contracts 
are required to submit,” and to “report to [the President] within 90 days on the overall accuracy of 
the contractors’ certifications.” Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies (Jan. 20, 2010), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/memorandum-heads-executive-departments-and-agencies-1. 
74 See Internal Revenue Manual § 32.1.5.4.7.5.3(4) (2015). 
75 Id. 
76 See generally Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 53 Duke 
L.J. 1067 (2003). 
77 White House Office of Information & Regulatory Affairs, Regulatory Impact Analysis: 
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) 1 (Feb. 7, 2011), available at 
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regulation’s effect on the economy. For example, in determining that a regulation 
adjusting patent fees qualified as a “significant” action under Executive Order 
12866, the Patent and Trademarks Office considered the additional fees that the 
regulation would generate.78 Likewise, in determining whether a recent rule on 
registration fees qualified as “significant,” the Drug Enforcement Agency 
calculated the additional fees that the rule would raise and factored those into its 
estimate of the regulation’s annual economic effect.79 The IRS’s interpretation of 
“annual effect on the economy” is thus at odds with White House 
pronouncements and with the practices of other agencies. 
 The IRS’s second argument is even more perplexing. Most regulations 
promulgated by any agency implement a statute—after all, statutes are the source 
of agencies’ authority. The same rationale would seem to justify exemptions from 
Executive Order 12866 for EPA regulations implementing the Clean Air Act—
the bread and butter of OIRA review.80 And the IRS cites no source for its claim 
that regulations implementing statutes are exempt from Executive Order 12866.81 
 Nonetheless, the IRS’s exemption claim cannot be challenged in court. 
Executive Order 12866, by its own terms, “is intended only to improve the 
internal management of the Federal Government and does not create any right or 
benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against 
the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any 
other person.” 82  In other words, only the President can enforce the order. 
Successive Presidents have declined to demand that the IRS submit its significant 
regulations for White House review.83 So while the President’s formal power with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/OMB/circulars/a004/a-
4_FAQ.pdf. 
78 Dep’t of Commerce, Patent & Trademark Office, Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees—Final 
Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 4212 (2013). 
79 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Economic Impact Analysis of Final 
Rule on Controlled Substances and List I Chemical Registration and 
Reregistration Fees, DEA-346, at 18 (Feb. 2012), available at 
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/fed_regs/rules/2012/reg_csa_fees/2012-03-
08_economic_impact_analysis.pdf. 
80 But see Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for 
Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees—Proposed Rule, 
80 Fed. Reg. 38,516 (July 6, 2015) (regulatory impact analysis pursuant to Executive Order 12866 
for proposed rule interpreting FLSA); Regulatory Impact Analyses, U.S. Env’tl Protection Agency 
http://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/ria.html (last updated Nov. 17, 2015) (compiling RIAs for EPA 
regulations implementing the Clean Air Act). 
81 The IRS’s exemption claim is particularly perplexing because Executive Order 12866 does not 
exempt regulations with an annual effect on the economy of less than $100 million from the cost-
benefit analysis requirement; rather, regulations that fall below the $100 million threshold (and 
that do not otherwise qualify as “significant”) are exempt from the requirement of OIRA review. A 
recent comment from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in a tax-related rulemaking emphasizes 
this point. See Comment from U.S. Chamber of Commerce, RE: Supplemental Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking on Minimum Value of Eligible Employer-Sponsored 
Health Plans (Nov. 2, 2015), available at 
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/uscc_minimum_value_supp_n
prm.pdf. 
82 Exec. Order 12866, § 10 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
83 The IRS’s noncompliance with Executive Order 12866 thus offers another example of “tax 
exceptionalism.” On tax exceptionalism, see generally Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: 
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respect to the IRS is no different than with respect to other parts of the Executive 
Branch, past Presidents have not sought to exercise this power (or, at least, have 
not sought to exercise this power through presidential review of tax regulations). 
 
C. Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations 
 
 While Executive Order 12866 is not judicially enforceable, Treasury’s tax 
regulations are judicially reviewable. And until recently, judicial review of tax 
regulations offered another example of tax exceptionalism. As noted above, the 
Supreme Court set forth a two-step framework for judicial review of agency 
statutory interpretations in the Chevron case, decided in 1984. Five years earlier, 
though, in National Muffler Dealers Association v. United States,84 the Court set out a 
somewhat different test for judicial review of IRS interpretations of the tax code. 
 National Muffler laid out a multifactor test for determining whether an 
interpretation of a tax statute in a Treasury regulation would pass judicial muster. 
The first factor was whether the regulation “is a substantially contemporaneous 
construction of the statute by those presumed to have been aware of congressional 
intent,” or whether “the regulation dates from a later period.”85 (Regulations 
issued immediately after the statute was passed would carry greater force.) Other 
factors included “the length of time the regulation has been in effect,” “the 
reliance placed on it,” “the consistency of the Commissioner’s interpretation,” and 
“the degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation during subsequent 
re-enactments of the statute.” 86  For decades, the Supreme Court oscillated 
between citing National Muffler and Chevron without any acknowledgement of the 
gap between the two.87 The Tax Court, for its part, also went back and forth: in 
the 1985-2010 period, it cited Chevron but not National Muffler in 49 cases; cited 
National Muffler but not Chevron in 58 cases; and cited both Chevron and National 
Muffler in 28 cases. 
 Finally, in 2011, the Supreme Court stepped in to resolve the confusion. In 
Mayo Foundation, the Court unanimously rejected National Muffler and announced 
that Chevron would apply to tax. As Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court, 
“[t]he principles underlying our decision in Chevron apply with full force in the tax 
context.” 88  Mayo Foundation laid to rest any notion that Treasury and IRS 
interpretations of tax statutes might deserve less deference than agency 
interpretations in other contexts. 
 To be sure, Chevron deference does not mean that the IRS will win every 
statutory interpretation case. Recent IRS losses in the Federal Circuit and the Tax 
Court make that much clear.89 Moreover, win rates are a flawed measure of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1537 (2006); Lawrence 
Zelenak, Maybe Just a Little Bit Special After All?, 63 Duke L.J. 1897 (2014). 
84 440 U.S. 472 (1979). 
85 Nat’l Muffler, 440 U.S. at 477. 
86 Id. 
87 See Mayo Foundation, 131 S.Ct. at 712 (collecting cases). 
88 Id. at 713. Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in King v. Burwell has injected additional 
uncertainty into the tax deference debate. See generally Kristin E. Hickman, The (Perhaps) 
Unintended Consequences of King v. Burwell, 2015 Pepp. L. Rev. 56. 
89 See Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012);  
Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. No. 3 (July 27, 2015). The IRS’s appeal from the Altera decision 
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success because of selection at the filing and settlement stages.90 What we do know 
is that in court of appeals cases between 2003 and 2013 in which the court has 
applied Chevron, the IRS’s win rate is approximately 83%—higher than the overall 
agency average for Chevron cases.91 
 
D. Executive Action or Legislation 
 
 Unilateral executive action is, of course, not the only way that Presidents 
can pursue their policy objectives.92 A President also can submit a legislative 
proposal to Congress and can then use his bully pulpit to put pressure on 
Congress to pass the proposal. One advantage of the legislative route is that 
statutes are more durable than regulations and executive orders: a future 
administration with a different set of policy preferences can rescind a rule or 
order, but it cannot repeal a statute without the support of majorities in the House 
and Senate.93 And where the relevant statutes limit the President’s latitude to 
pursue policy objectives via executive action, the legislative route may be the only 
one available. 
 Nonetheless, recent Presidents have used regulations and other executive 
actions to pursue policy objectives on many occasions, often testing the limits of 
executive authority. As noted above, the Obama administration has pursued 
major policies regarding guns, health, the environment, labor, and immigration 
via regulatory action. Examples from the administration of George W. Bush, in 
addition to those mentioned in the introduction, include an FDA rule compelling 
food manufacturers to label products for trans-fat content94 and an EPA rule 
setting stricter limits on particle pollution95—both of which followed from OIRA 
“prompt” letters instructing the relevant agency to act.96 Examples from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit. See Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, Nos. 16-70496, 16-
70497 (9th Cir. appeal filed Feb. 9, 2016). 
90 See Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go To Trial?: An Empirical Study of Predictors of 
Failure To Settle, 49 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 315 (1999).  
91 Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts 51 tbl. 3 (Univ. of Ga. Sch. 
of Law Research Paper Series, No. 2016-27, July 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2808848.  
92 Moreover, regulations are not the only way that Presidents can pursue policy objectives through 
executive action. On sub-regulatory mechanisms outside tax, see Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive 
Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use 
Them to Bind the Public?, 41 Duke L.J. 1311 (1992). On sub-regulatory mechanisms in tax law, 
see Berman & Haneman, supra note 38, at 192. On presidential control over sub-regulatory 
mechanisms, see generally Nou, supra note 58. This article analyzes the choice between executive 
action and legislation without focusing on the varieties of executive action. The question of 
when—and why—Treasury and the IRS use regulations as opposed to revenue rulings, general 
counsel memoranda, and other documents is a significant but separate question. 
93 On the benefits to interest groups of durable laws, see generally Saul Levmore, The Timing of 
Lawmaking: lnterest Groups and the Durability of Law, in The Timing of Lawmaking (Saul 
Levmore and Frank Fagan, eds., Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming). 
94 See John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 395, 461-62 (2008). 
95 Env’tl Protection Agency, National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter—
Final Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 61144 (Oct. 17, 2006). 
96 See Letter from John D. Graham, Administrator, Office of Information & Regulatory Affairs, to 
Tommy G. Thompson, Sec’y of Health & Human Servs. (Sept. 18, 2001), available at 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/hhs_prompt_letter.html; Letter from John D. Graham, 
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Clinton years are even more numerous: from extending Medicare to cover clinical 
trials, to bolstering regulations for the testing and labeling of children’s 
prescription drugs, to imposing new safety standards for imported foods.97 This list 
is far from exhaustive. 
 Tax policymaking, though, follows a different pattern. As noted above, the 
President submits a set of tax proposals to Congress each year along with his 
budget. And each year, Congress fails to act on many (generally, most) of the 
proposals in the President’s Greenbook. Yet rarely do the President and his 
Treasury Department then pursue Greenbook goals via regulation. This is so even 
though, as detailed in the next section, many failed Greenbook proposals could be 
carried out through executive action. 
  
E. The President’s Greenbook and the Regulatory Road Not Taken 
 
 In February 2016, President Obama submitted his eighth and final 
Greenbook to Congress. As with every other Greenbook produced by the Obama 
administration, this one included a number of proposals that the President—
through Treasury and the IRS—likely could have implemented on his own. This 
section provides a partial list of those proposals, several of which also appeared in 
Clinton administration Greenbooks.98 To be sure, if the President and Treasury 
sought to enact these measures via regulation, taxpayers might have challenged 
those regulatory actions in court. But in other areas of law, President Obama—
like his predecessors—has been more than willing to act unilaterally even in the 
face of certain court challenges (and uncertain results). 
 The following summaries are written for readers with only a basic 
understanding of tax law. Scholars and practitioners primarily focused on tax will 
find that some nuances are addressed in only broad brushstrokes. The goal of this 
section is to offer an introduction to the sorts of proposals that presidential 
administrations could carry out on their own but instead include in their 
Greenbooks. It does not provide a comprehensive treatment of any one such 
proposal. 
 
 1. Taxing Carried Interests as Ordinary Income 
 
 A partnership profits interest—colloquially known as a “carried 
interest”—is the right to receive a percentage of a partnership’s future profits. 
Unlike a capital interest, a profits interest does not entail a right to receive money 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Administrator, Office of Information & Regulatory Affairs, to Christine Todd Whitman, 
Administrator, U.S. Env’tl Protection Agency (Dec. 4, 2001), available at 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/epa_pm_research_prompt120401.html.  
97 See Kagan, supra note 23, at 2295, 2304-05. 
98 Victor Fleischer has generated a separate list of tax law reforms that Treasury could accomplish 
via regulatory action. See Victor Fleischer, 8 Tax Loopholes the Obama Administration Could 
Close, N.Y. Times: Dealbook (Feb. 18, 2015), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/02/18/8-tax-
loopholes-the-obama-administration-could-close. My list differs from Fleischer’s insofar as the 
proposals listed here are all proposals that the President has already endorsed in the Greenbook. 
Fleischer identifies measures that are “consistent with President Obama’s renewed interest in 
business tax policy,” rather than measures that the President is already on the record as 
supporting. 
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or other property in the event that the partnership is liquidated.99 The typical 
private equity fund, hedge fund, and venture capital fund is organized as a 
partnership, with the managers as general partners. The standard formula for 
determining the managers’ compensation is known as “two and twenty”: the 
manager receives an annual fee equal to 2% of the fund’s total assets plus 20% of 
any profits. The 2% management fee is taxable as ordinary income. By contrast, 
managers generally pay no income tax when they receive the profits interest at the 
time the fund is formed; instead, profits are taxed as investment income as they 
are realized. If profits take the form of dividends or long-term capital gains, then 
managers are taxed at a top statutory rate of 20% instead of the 39.6% top 
statutory rate on ordinary income.100 
 The current state of affairs is largely the consequence of a revenue 
procedure issued by the IRS in the first year of the Clinton administration.101 It is 
not an inevitable result of the existing statutory scheme. Section 707 of the 
Internal Revenue Code, which dates back to 1954, empowers the Treasury 
Secretary to promulgate regulations addressing circumstances in which “a partner 
performs services for a partnership.” 102 The statute authorizes the Treasury 
Secretary to treat those transactions as if they “occurr[ed] between the 
partnership and one who is not a partner.”103 That provision would at least 
arguably allow the Secretary to characterize allocations to the manager of an 
investment partnership such as a private equity, venture capital, or hedge fund as 
ordinary income—without any further action by Congress. (Indeed, one 
prominent tax law scholar has written a model regulation with specific language 
that the Treasury Secretary could copy.104)  
 Yet instead of using Treasury’s existing authority under section 707, 
President Obama asked Congress in his first Greenbook to pass legislation that 
would lead to ordinary income treatment for carried interest profits.105 President 
Obama has included similar proposals in each of his seven Greenbooks since 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax’n, JCS-4-09, Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in 
the President’s Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Proposal—Part One: Individual Income Tax and Estate 
and Gift Tax Provisions 110 (Sept. 2009). 
100 See generally Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity 
Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (2008). For many hedge fund managers, a significant share of carried 
interest income comes from short-term capital gains, in which case hedge fund managers face the 
same statutory rates as for ordinary income. For this reason, private equity and venture capital 
fund managers, not hedge fund managers, appear to be the primary beneficiaries of the carried 
interest status quo. See Victor Fleischer, Why Hedge Funds Don’t Worry About Carried Interest 
Tax Rules, N.Y. Times: Dealbook (May 14, 2014), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/14/why-hedge-funds-dont-worry-about-carried-interest-
tax-rules. 
101 Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343. 
102 26 U.S.C. § 707(a)(2)(A). 
103 Id. § 707(a)(1). 
104 Fleischer, supra note 39. In addition, Steven Rosenthal, a former tax partner at the law firm of 
Ropes & Gray and now a senior fellow at the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, has suggested 
that the Treasury Department could reform the taxation of carried interest profits for private 
equity fund managers by promulgating regulations that clarify that the income of a private equity 
fund is income from a “trade or business” for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code—and thus 
ineligible for capital gains treatment. See Steven M. Rosenthal, Private Equity Is a Business: Sun 
Capital and Beyond, 140 Tax Notes 1459 (Sept. 23, 2013).  
105 See FY 2010 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 23. 
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then.106 This could not be because Obama administration officials are unaware of 
their section 707 authority: writers in mainstream media outlets have noted the 
President’s power to change the tax treatment of carried interests via 
regulation.107 And whatever the (non-political) costs of drafting regulations under 
section 707, those costs pale in comparison to the revenues that such a change 
would generate. The most recent Greenbook estimates that taxing carried 
interests as ordinary income would raise an additional $19.3 billion over the next 
decade. 108  Others have estimated that the revenues would be an order of 
magnitude greater: Victor Fleischer calculates that a change in the tax treatment 
of carried interests would raise roughly $180 billion over a decade.109 
 To be sure, Treasury regulations ending the preferential treatment of 
carried interest would face court challenges (although as noted above, the specter 
of litigation has not prevented this President or his administration from taking 
unilateral action in other areas110). Elsewhere, I have suggested that well-written 
regulations on carried interest would have a reasonable likelihood of surviving 
judicial review, but it is far from a certainty.111 Moreover, the analysis here does 
not suggest that the President ought to alter the tax treatment of carried interests 
through executive action: as David Weisbach has argued, “[t]here are sound 
reasons, many deeply embedded in partnership tax law, for retaining [the status 
quo].”112 At least for the purposes of this article, I remain agnostic on the 
normative question. President Obama, however, is not agnostic: he and his 
administration have staked out a position publicly, and his position is that carried 
interest profits ought to be taxed as ordinary income. The puzzle is why the 
President, notwithstanding his expressed view, has declined to implement his 
preferred policy through executive action.113 And as discussed in the remainder of 
this section, the puzzle is in no way unique to carried interest. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 See supra note 33. 
107 See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, How Obama Can Increase Taxes on Carried Interest, N.Y. Times: 
Dealbook (June 12, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/how-the-president-can-
increase-taxes-on-carried-interest; David Lebedoff, Why Doesn’t Obama End the Hedge Fund 
Tax Break?, Slate (June 2, 2014), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2014/06/taxation_of_carried_interest_the_l
oophole_for_hedge_fund_managers_could.html. Senator Bernie Sanders also has called on the 
Obama administration to address the carried interest issue through regulatory action. See Letter 
from Sen. Bernie Sanders to President Barack Obama (Feb. 27, 2015), available at 
http://www.budget.senate.gov/democratic/public/_cache/files/7a8dbc99-3850-4760-be3a-
2361c1ec4208/sanders-letter-to-white-house-on-tax-loopholes.pdf. 
108 FY 2017 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 269 tbl.1. 
109 Victor Fleischer, An Income Tax on Carried Interest Couldn’t Be Avoided, N.Y. Times: 
Dealbook (July 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/business/dealbook/an-income-
tax-on-carried-interest-couldnt-be-avoided.html. 
110 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
111 Daniel Hemel, Two-and-Twenty and Fifty-Fifty, Whatever Source Derived (May 12, 2016), 
http://bit.ly/29BUEtp. 
112 David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 715, 
764 (2008).  
113 After a New York Times columnist suggested that the Obama administration could “close the so-
called carried interest loophole” via regulation, a Treasury spokesperson told a reporter for the 
publication Tax Notes that “it’s the department’s position that ‘only Congress can fully close the 
carried interest loophole.’” Amy S. Elliott, IRS Official Addresses Carried Interest Speculation, 
Tax Notes, May 16, 2016, at 857; see Gretchen Morgenson, Ending Tax Break for Ultrawealthy 
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 2. Restricting the Use of Structures That Generate Stateless Income   
 
 The check-the-box rules allow certain “eligible entities” to choose whether 
to be taxed as corporations or as partnerships (or, in the case of entities with a 
single owner, to be “disregarded” and treated as though part of the owner). The 
check-the-box regime has facilitated the phenomenon of “stateless income,” a 
term used to describe business income of a multinational group that is not taxed in 
the country where the group’s customers reside, nor in the country where the 
group’s factors of production are located, nor in the country where the group’s 
parent company is domiciled.114 One method of generating stateless income that 
has attracted significant attention from the media and from members of Congress 
in recent years is the “Double Irish Dutch Sandwich”—a technique that Apple, 
Google (now “Alphabet” 115 ), and many other high-tech companies have 
employed.116 
 The basic structure of the sandwich is as follows: ABC Inc., a U.S. 
corporation with a popular mobile app, incorporates a holding company in 
Ireland (the top piece of bread) and puts cash inside the holding company. The 
Irish holding company then acquires ABC’s intangible rights to its app for 
Europe. Although the holding company is incorporated in Ireland, it is 
headquartered in Bermuda and recognized as a Bermuda resident for purposes of 
Irish tax law. The holding company elects to be treated as a corporation for U.S. 
tax purposes pursuant to the check-the-box regime. 
 Next, the holding company licenses its regional rights to a Dutch 
subsidiary (the middle layer of the sandwich), which then licenses those rights to a 
lower-tier Irish subsidiary (the bottom piece of bread). Both the Dutch subsidiary 
and the Irish subsidiary are treated as corporations under local law but “check the 
box” to be treated as disregarded entities under U.S. law. The Irish subsidiary 
then earns royalties from European users of the app.  
 The arrangement yields favorable tax consequences for ABC. The lower-
tier Irish subsidiary has virtually no net income taxable in Ireland: its revenues 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
May Not Take an Act of Congress, N.Y. Times, May 6, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/08/business/ending-tax-break-for-ultrawealthy-may-not-
take-act-of-congress.html. Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton subsequently told a 
reporter that if she is elected, and if Congress does not pass carried interest reform on its own, she 
will direct her Treasury Department to take regulatory action on carried interest. See Heidi M. 
Przybyla, USA Today Interview: Clinton Says She’ll Call Trump Unfit To Handle Economoy, 
USA Today, June 16, 2016, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/06/15/hillary-clinton-donald-
trump-economy/85928334.  
114 See Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 Fla. Tax. L. Rev. 699, 701 (2011). 
115 See Conor Dougherty, Google to Reorganize as Alphabet to Keep Its Lead as an Innovator, 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/technology/google-alphabet-
restructuring.html. 
116 See id. at 707-08; Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in 
Taxes, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/business/apples-tax-
strategy-aims-at-low-tax-states-and-nations.html. On Google’s continued use of the “Double Irish” 
structure, see Toby Sterling & Tom Bergin, Google Accounts Show 11 Billion Euros Moved via 
Low Tax ‘Dutch Sandwich’ in 2014, Reuters, Feb. 19, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
google-tax-idUSKCN0VS1GP. 
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from European customers are almost entirely offset by its royalty payments to the 
Dutch subsidiary. The Dutch subsidiary, in turn, has virtually no net income 
taxable in the Netherlands: its royalty payments from the lower-tier Irish 
subsidiary are almost entirely offset by its payments back to the Irish holding 
company. And the Irish holding company’s income is not taxable under Irish law 
because Ireland considers the company to be a resident of Bermuda. Bermuda, for 
its part, imposes no corporate tax. And from the U.S. Treasury’s perspective, the 
Irish holding company’s income is the income of a foreign corporation, which is 
not taxable in the United States until ABC repatriates the earnings.117 
 The sandwich arrangement is facilitated by Treasury’s decision to allow 
ABC to treat the Dutch subsidiary as a disregarded entity under check-the-box. If 
the Dutch subsidiary were considered a corporation for U.S. tax purposes, then 
the royalty payment from the Dutch subsidiary to the Irish holding company 
could be taxable immediately in the United States. That is because under Subpart 
F of the Internal Revenue Code, royalties earned by a foreign corporation that 
ABC owns (a “controlled foreign corporation,” or CFC) are included in ABC’s 
income for U.S. tax purposes if the royalties originate in a country other than the 
country in which the foreign corporation is organized.118 So under Subpart F, 
royalties from a Dutch corporation to an Irish corporation controlled by ABC are 
part of ABC’s taxable income, regardless of when ABC repatriates the income. 
ABC can get out from under Subpart F because the Dutch subsidiary and the 
Irish holding company are considered the same entity under check-the-box.119  
 As discussed in more detail below, the check-the-box rules are creatures of 
regulation,120 and so presumably could be amended by regulation as well.121 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 See Kleinbard, supra note 114, at 707-14. 
118 26 U.S.C. §§ 954(c)(1)(A), (3)(A). 
119 The Dutch corporation is necessary because Ireland imposes a withholding tax on royalties 
paid by an Irish corporation to a Bermuda company. Since Ireland considers the lower-tier Irish 
subsidiary to be an Irish corporation and considers the holding company to be a Bermuda entity, 
Ireland would impose a withholding tax if not for the Dutch layer of the sandwich. See Kleinbard, 
supra note 114, at 713. 
120 See infra Section I.I. 
121 There is an important exception to this claim: If the royalties earned by the lower-level Irish 
subsidiary are “derived in the active conduct of a trade or business” and received from an 
unrelated person, then the royalty income would not be Subpart F income. 26 U.S.C. § 954(c)(2). 
And under the “look-thru” rule, royalties received by higher-level subsidiaries would not constitute 
Subpart F income to the extent attributable to the non-Subpart F income of the lower-level Irish 
subsidiary. § 954(c)(6).  
 Yet as important as this exception is, there are three reasons to believe that Treasury still 
has the ability to restrict hybrid branch arrangements like the Double Irish Dutch in significant 
ways. First, while the “active conduct of a trade or business” rule in § 954(c)(2) is statutory, the 
term “active conduct of a trade or business” is not self-defining. Treasury can (and to some extent 
has) defined the term so as to exclude subsidiaries whose activities are insubstantial in comparison 
to the royalties they receive. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.954-2T (2015). 
 Second, the “look-thru” rule of § 954(c)(6)—while statutory—is also temporary. 
Originally added in 2006 and set to expire at the end of 2008, it has since been extended five 
times, and is now scheduled to lapse at the end of 2019. See 26 U.S.C.S. § 954 (LexisNexis 2016). 
This means that check-the-box reform today would indeed limit the ability of U.S. multinationals 
to avoid Subpart F tax through the use of hybrid branches—but the effects would only be felt 
starting in 2020.  
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Indeed, shortly after promulgating the check-the-box rules, the Treasury 
Department under President Clinton published Notice 98-11 in February 1998 
announcing its intention to issue regulations addressing the use of “hybrid 
branch” arrangements similar to the Double Irish Dutch.122 (The Dutch layer of 
the sandwich is a “hybrid branch” because it is considered a corporation under 
Dutch and Irish law but a branch of its Irish parent under the U.S. check-the-box 
regime.) Two months later, Treasury published proposed and temporary 
regulations under which payments from a hybrid branch to a CFC would give rise 
to Subpart F income (i.e., income immediately taxable by the United States) when 
certain conditions are present: specifically, the payment by the hybrid branch 
reduces the foreign tax of the payor; the payment consists of dividends, interest, 
royalties, or rents that would have qualified as Subpart F income if the payment 
had been made by one corporation to another; and the effective tax rate of the 
payee is significantly lower than that of the payor.123 (The last condition would be 
satisfied in the Double Irish Dutch example if Bermuda’s corporate income tax 
rate is less than 90% of, and at least 5 percentage points lower than, that of the 
Netherlands.124) 
 Notice 98-11 was not long lived. In May 1998, the Senate passed a bill 
that would have imposed a six-month moratorium on any final rule with respect 
to Notice 98-11, and that expressed “the sense of the Senate” that Treasury 
should withdraw the notice.125 Less than two months later, Treasury withdrew the 
notice as well as the proposed and temporary regulations addressing hybrid 
branches.126 The withdrawal notice never suggested that Treasury lacked the 
authority to act under existing law. Rather, it stated:  
 
The purpose of this action is to allow Congress an appropriate period to 
review the important policy issues raised by the regulations, including the 
continuing applicability of the policy rationale of subpart F, and, if 
appropriate, address these issues by legislation.127 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 Third, the successive extensions of the look-thru rule are politically more palatable 
because of the check-the-box regulations in the background. Each extension has a limited effect on 
the budget—according to the Joint Committee on Taxation’s calculations—because JCT takes for 
granted the continuity of the current check-the-box regime. Thus, JCT scored the most recent 
five-year extension of the look-thru rule as reducing revenues by $7.8 billion. Joint Comm. on 
Tax’n, JCX-143-15, Estimated Budget Effects of Division Q of Amendment #2 to the Senate 
Amendment to H.R. 2029 (Rules Committee Print 114-40), for the “Protecting Americans from 
Tax Hikes Act of 2015,” at 2 (Dec. 16, 2015). That figure would be much larger if U.S. 
multinationals did not already have the ability to avoid Subpart F through hybrid branch 
arrangements like the Double Irish Dutch.  
122 Notice 98-11, 1998-1 C.B. 433 (Feb. 9, 1998). 
123 Guidance Under Subpart F Relating to Partnerships and Branches, Treas. Dec. 8767, 1998-1 
C.B. 875 (Apr. 20, 1998). 
124 It is.  Bermuda imposes no corporate income tax, while the top corporate income tax rate in the 
Netherlands is 25%. See Brian O’Keefe & Marty Jones, How Uber Plays the Tax Shell Game, 
Fortune, Oct. 22, 2015, http://fortune.com/2015/10/22/uber-tax-shell. 
125 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 2676, 105th Cong., § 
3713 (as passed by the Senate, May 7, 1998). 
126 Notice 98-35, 1998-2 C.B. 34 (July 6, 1998). 
127 Id. 
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 Nearly two decades have passed since Notice 98-11, and Congress still has 
yet to pass legislation addressing the Double Irish Dutch. Yet the Obama 
administration, rather than reviving Notice 98-11, has continued to ask Congress 
for a bill to restrict the use of the sandwich structure and similar mechanisms that 
generate stateless income.128 The most recent Greenbook estimates that such 
legislation would raise $2.5 billion over the next decade.129 
 
 3. Limiting Foreign Tax Credits Claimed by Dual-Capacity Taxpayers 
 
 Section 901 of the Code allows U.S. taxpayers to claim a credit for income 
taxes paid to a foreign country.”130 Section 903 extends the credit to taxes “paid 
in lieu of a tax on income.”131 Questions often arise with respect to payments 
made by oil and gas companies to foreign governments in exchange for specific 
benefits such as the right to drill for oil on government land. If such payments are 
creditable, they can reduce the companies’ U.S. tax bill dollar-for-dollar. If those 
payments are merely deductible business expenses, though, they reduce the 
companies’ U.S. tax bill by approximately 35 cents on the dollar (a $1 deduction 
from taxable income multiplied by a 35% corporate tax rate).132  
 In regulations promulgated in 1983, the Treasury Department addressed 
the application of the foreign tax credit provisions to so-called “dual capacity 
taxpayers”— taxpayers who are “subject to a levy of a foreign state” and who also 
receive “a specific economic benefit from the state.”133 The regulations spell out a 
facts-and-circumstances test for determining whether a foreign levy qualifies as a 
creditable tax or as a deductible expense.134 The regulations also establish a safe 
harbor for dual capacity taxpayers who want to claim a foreign tax credit without 
going through the trouble of proving that the levy qualifies as a tax under the 
facts-and-circumstances test. The safe harbor allows the taxpayer to compute the 
creditable tax based on the general tax rate in the foreign country, or—if the 
foreign country does not impose a general tax—based on the applicable U.S. 
federal tax rate.135 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 See, e.g., FY 2016 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 36. Ireland has announced changes to its tax 
laws that would prevent multinational firms from using the “Double Irish with a Dutch Sandwich” 
structure described above. Existing arrangements such as Alphabet’s would be exempt from the 
new rules until 2020 under a grandfather clause. Moreover, multinational firms could replicate the 
arrangement under the new laws by replacing the Bermuda company with a company 
headquartered in Malta or the United Arab Emirates, thus keeping all the key ingredients of the 
sandwich structure in place. See Jeffrey L. Rubinger & Summer Ayers Lepree, Death of the 
“Double Irish Dutch Sandwich”? Not So Fast, Taxes Without Borders (Oct. 23, 2014), 
http://www.taxeswithoutbordersblog.com/2014/10/death-of-the-double-irish-dutch-sandwich-
not-so-fast. 
129 FY 2017 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 265 tbl. 
130 26 U.S.C. § 901(b)(1). 
131 26 U.S.C. § 903. 
132 See, e.g., Joseph Isenbergh, The Foreign Tax Credit: Royalties, Subsidies, and Creditable 
Taxes, 39 Tax. L. Rev. 227, 270 (1984); John P. Steines, Jr., The Foreign Tax Credit at Ninety-
Five: Bionic Centenarian, 66 Tax L. Rev. 545, 554 (2013). 
133 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(a)(2)(ii). 
134 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2A(b)-(c). 
135 § 1.901-2A(e). 
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 In the Greenbook for fiscal year 1998, the Clinton administration 
proposed a change to the dual capacity rules: under the Clinton proposal, dual 
capacity taxpayers would not be able to claim a credit for payments to a foreign 
government if the foreign country has no general tax. 136  The Clinton 
administration repeated the proposal in its Greenbook for fiscal years 1999, 2000, 
and 2001.137 The Obama administration has included similar proposals in the 
Greenbooks for fiscal years 2010 through 2017.138 The administration’s most 
recent estimate is that the proposal, if implemented, would raise revenues by more 
than $9.6 billion over the next decade.139  
 While both President Clinton and President Obama asked Congress to 
amend the rules for dual capacity taxpayers, it seems that the Treasury 
Department could adopt this proposal unilaterally if it chose. No statute 
unambiguously allows a dual capacity taxpayer to claim a credit for payments 
made to a foreign country with no general tax. If anything, section 903 suggests 
that such payments should not be creditable: if there is no general tax, then the 
payment is not made “in lieu of a tax on income . . . generally imposed by [the] 
foreign country.”140 The safe harbor that the last two Democratic Presidents have 
sought to eliminate is a safe harbor created by regulations that Treasury could 
rescind. Nonetheless, the Clinton and Obama administrations have declined to 
act on their own, even though their statutory authority to do so seems to be quite 
clear. 
  
 4. Repealing the Lower-of-Cost-or-Market Inventory Accounting Method 
 
 Taxpayers that sell goods as part of an active trade or business can claim a 
deduction for the cost of goods sold that tax year. Rather than tracking inventory 
on an item-by-item basis, taxpayers can determine the cost of goods sold by 
adding the value of their inventory at the start of the year to the value of 
purchases made during the year and subtracting the value of their end-of-year 
inventory. Congress has delegated authority to the Treasury Secretary to 
prescribe methods for inventory accounting. The relevant statute, section 471, 
reads: 
 
Whenever in the opinion of the Secretary the use of inventories is 
necessary in order clearly to determine the income of any taxpayer, 
inventories shall be taken by such taxpayer on such basis as the Secretary 
may prescribe as conforming as nearly as may be to the best accounting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Revenue Proposals 
74 (Feb. 1997) [hereinafter FY 1998 Greenbook]. 
137 See Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax’n, JCS-2-00, Description of Revenue Provisions 
Contained in the President’s Fiscal Year 2001 Budget Proposal 539 (Mar. 6, 2000) (discussing 
proposal’s history). 
138 See FY 2010 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 39-40; FY 2011 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 49-
50; FY 2012 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 49-50; FY 2013 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 94-95; 
FY 2014 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 55-56; FY 2015 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 51-52; FY 
2016 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 26-27; FY 2017 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 16-17. 
139 FY 2017 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 265 tbl.1. 
140 See 26 U.S.C. § 903. 
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practice in the trade or business and as most clearly reflecting the 
income.141  
 
 One of the approaches allowed by Treasury is the “lower-of-cost-or-
market” (LCM) method.142 Under the LCM method, a taxpayer values inventory 
at the end of the year by taking the lower of (1) the cost of goods and (2) the 
market value. LCM thus allows taxpayers to take a write-down when the market 
value of inventory goods has declined. This means that taxpayers can recognize 
losses even before goods are sold or exchanged—in marked contrast to the general 
tax law principle of realization.143  
 No statute specifically authorizes taxpayers to use LCM. The ability of 
taxpayers to use LCM arises due to Treasury regulations, and section 471 gives 
broad discretion to the Treasury Secretary. Nonetheless, both President Clinton 
and President Obama have asked Congress to repeal LCM, rather than amending 
the inventory regulations on their own. Proposals to repeal LCM have appeared 
in the Greenbooks for fiscal years 1997 through 2001 and every year in which 
President Obama has been in office.144 The Treasury Department now estimates 
that repealing LCM would raise revenue by approximately $6.8 billion over the 
next decade.145  
 
5. Modifying the Gift Tax Rules for Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts  
 
 Section 2702 governs the gift tax treatment of transfers of interests in trusts 
among family members. As a general rule, when one family member (e.g., a 
mother) sets up a trust for the benefit of another family member (e.g., her son) but 
retains an interest in the trust herself, the value of the retained interest is treated as 
zero for gift tax purposes.146 Section 2702 also creates an exception to the general 
rule: if the interest retained by the mother is a “qualified interest,” then the value 
of the mother’s interest “shall be determined under section 7520.”147 A “qualified 
interest” includes “any interest which consists of the right to receive fixed amounts 
payable not less frequently than annually.”148 Section 7520, in turn, directs the 
Treasury Secretary to publish tables setting forth interest rates based on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 26 U.S.C. § 471(a). 
142 26 C.F.R. § 1.471-2(c). 
143 See Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax’n, JCS-2-12, Description of Revenue Provisions 
Contained in the President’s Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Proposal 521-22 (June 2012). 
144 See FY 1997 Greenbook, supra note 136, at 77; U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, General 
Explanations of the Administration’s Revenue Proposals 106 (Feb. 1998) [hereinafter FY 1999 
Greenbook]; U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Revenue 
Proposals 148-49 (Feb. 1999) [hereinafter FY 2000 Greenbook]; U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2001 Revenue Proposals 161-62 (Feb. 
2000) [hereinafter FY 2001 Greenbook]; FY 2010 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 118; FY 2011 
Greenbook, supra note 33, at 96; FY 2012 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 64; FY 2013 Greenbook, 
supra note 33, at 131; FY 2014 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 89; FY 2015 Greenbook, supra note 
33, at 94; FY 2016 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 110; FY 2017 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 106. 
145 FY 2017 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 267 tbl. 1. 
146 26 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a)(1)-(2). 
147 § 2702(a)(2)(B). 
148 § 2702(b)(1). 
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interest rates for federal debt.149 These provisions give rise to a well-known gift tax 
avoidance opportunity: the grantor retained annuity trust (GRAT).  
 To see how an individual can avoid gift taxes through a GRAT, imagine 
that the mother transfers 175 shares of Facebook stock to a trust, with the trust set 
to distribute all of its assets to the son after two years. As of this writing, shares of 
Facebook were trading for around $114, so 175 shares would be worth roughly 
$20,000. Normally, the transfer would be treated as a gift from mother to son; if 
the mother had exhausted her lifetime gift tax exemption ($5.45 million) and her 
annual gift tax exclusion ($14,000), then the gift would be taxed at a 40% rate.150 
Now imagine that the trust also transfers a note to the mother obligating the trust 
to make annual payments to the mother of $10,271.04 for two years. Under the 
IRS’s most recent section 7520 tables, the note would be valued (as of this writing) 
at $20,000.151 The transfer of the note from the trust to the mother would “zero 
out” the transfer of the Facebook stock from the mother to the trust, resulting in 
no gift tax liability. 
 Readers familiar with the valuation of options but unfamiliar with GRATs 
may find this result peculiar. If Facebook’s share price drops and the trust is 
unable to make payments to the mother, then the son is not liable: the mother gets 
whatever is remaining in the trust and the GRAT is said to have “failed.”152 But if 
Facebook’s share price rises and the trust has assets left over after satisfying its 
obligations to the mother, then the gains go to the son. The arrangement 
essentially amounts to the transfer of a set of call options on Facebook stock from 
mother to son. As of this writing, the market value of the call options would be in 
the range of $3,000.153 Yet under sections 2702 and 7520, the options worth 
$3,000 transferred from mother to son would be valued at zero for gift tax 
purposes. 
 Does the text of the Internal Revenue Code require this anomalous result? 
Not necessarily. Section 7520(b) states that “[t]his section shall not apply for 
purposes of . . . any . . . provision specified in regulations.”154 And section 7805 
authorizes the Treasury Secretary to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations 
for the enforcement of this title.” 155  Exercising his authority under these 
provisions, the Secretary might—for instance—promulgate a rule stating that the 
section 7520 tables should not be used to value a retained interest if the interest 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 § 7520(a). 
150 See, e.g., Internal Revenue Serv., What’s New—Estate and Gift Tax, 
https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Whats-New-Estate-and-Gift-
Tax (last updated Feb. 12, 2016). 
151 See Internal Revenue Serv., Section 7520 Interest Rates, 
https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Section-7520-Interest-Rates 
(last updated Feb. 18, 2016). The section 7520 interest rate for March 2016 is 1.8%. 
152 See Andrew Katzenstein & Stephanie Zaffos, When Assets Given to a GRAT Decline in Value, 
2010 Emerging Issues 2254 (LexisNexis). 
153 As of this writing, a call option on one share of Facebook stock with a strike price of $115 and a 
January 2017 expiration date was roughly $13; the value of an otherwise-identical option with a 
January 2018 expiration date was about $21. See NASDAQ, Facebook, Inc. (FB) Option Chain, 
http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/fb/option-chain (last updated Apr. 1, 2016). The GRAT 
described in text is a combination of a one-year and two-year call.  
154 26 U.S.C. § 7520(b). 
155 § 7805(a). 
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consists of the right to receive fixed amounts but there is a substantial risk of 
nonpayment because the trust is thinly capitalized. The Secretary might set forth 
specific criteria to assess whether a trust is thinly capitalized (e.g., if the remainder 
interest is less than 25% of the trust’s assets). The Secretary might point to the 
language in the definition of “qualified interest”—“the right to receive fixed 
amounts”156—and say that an interest does not qualify if the trust’s liabilities are 
so high relative to its assets that the “fixed” payments are subject to significant 
uncertainty. The Secretary might also invoke his authority under section 7520(b) 
to limit the use of the tables, as well as his general authority to promulgate anti-
abuse regulations under section 7805.  
 To be sure, the Secretary’s authority to crack down on undercapitalized 
GRATs is not entirely certain. When the IRS under President Clinton sought to 
challenge the Walton family’s use of zeroed-out GRATs, the Tax Court ruled in 
favor of the Waltons and against the Service.157 Yet in that case, the Tax Court 
emphasized that the IRS had not promulgated a legislative rule restricting zeroed-
out GRATs, and the court suggested that IRS might receive greater deference if it 
had followed the legislative-rule route.158 But instead of initiating a notice-and-
comment process and promulgating new rules, the Obama administration has 
repeatedly asked Congress to intervene. The past two Greenbooks, for example, 
have included a proposal to deny “qualified interest” status when a GRAT is 
undercapitalized.159  
 
 6. Disallowing the Deduction for Upward Development Easements 
 
 Whatever the uncertainty regarding the President’s ability to restrict the 
use of zeroed-out GRATs, his power to crack down on abuse of section 170(h) 
seems quite clear. That provision allows taxpayers to claim a deduction for a 
contribution of a partial interest in real property to a qualified organization if the 
contribution is “exclusively for conservation purposes.”160 Section 170(h) also 
defines “conservation purpose” to include “the preservation of an historically 
important land area or a certified historic structure.”161 Under this provision, a 
taxpayer who lives in a house listed in the National Register of Historic Places or 
located in a registered historic district might donate an easement to an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 § 2702(b)(1). 
157 See Walton v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 589 (2000). 
158 See id. at 597 (“The regulations at issue here are interpretative regulations . . . . Hence, while 
entitled to considerable weight, they are accorded less deference than would be legislative 
regulations issued under a specific grant of authority to address a matter raised by the pertinent 
statute.”). 
159 See FY 2017 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 181 (“The proposal also would include a 
requirement that the remainder interest in the GRAT at the time the interest is created must have 
a minimum value equal to the greater of 25 percent of the value of the assets contributed to the 
GRAT or $500,000 (but not more than the value of the assets contributed).”); accord FY 2016 
Greenbook, supra note 33, at 198. 
160 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(1)(C) (defining “qualified conservation contribution” to include a 
contribution “exclusively for conservation purposes”); see also § 170(f)(3)(A) (denying a deduction 
for certain contributions of partial interests in property); § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) (allowing an exception for 
a “qualified conservation contribution”).  
161 § 170(h)(4)(A)(iv). 
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architectural trust that prevents the taxpayer or any future owner of the house 
from substantially altering the exterior or interior of the home; the taxpayer could 
claim a deduction for the value of the easement (subject to certain conditions 
regarding appraisal and public access).162 Some taxpayers have sought to claim a 
deduction for contributing an “air rights” easement to an architectural trust—that 
is, an easement restricting development in the air space above a historic structure 
they own.163 The Treasury Department has expressed concerns about “abuses” of 
section 170(h), specifically in cases in which taxpayers “have taken large 
deductions for contributions of easements restricting upward development of 
historic urban buildings even though such development was already restricted by 
local authorities.”164 
 President Obama has asked Congress to pass legislation that would 
address abuses of the deduction for conservation easements. In the Greenbook for 
fiscal year 2014, the President included a proposal to “disallow a deduction for 
any value of an historic preservation easement associated with forgone upward 
development above an historic building.”165 The President reiterated this proposal 
in his Greenbooks for fiscal years 2015, 2016, and 2017.166 The President has not, 
however, instructed the Treasury Department to take regulatory action against 
deductions for upward development easements, even though the Executive 
Branch likely has the authority to prohibit such deductions on its own. 
 Recall that the relevant statutory definition of “conservation purpose” is 
“the preservation of an historically important land area or a certified historic 
structure.”167 Treasury could promulgate regulations stating that restrictions on 
upward development do not “preserv[e]” an important land area or historic 
structure. A taxpayer challenging the regulation would have a difficult time 
arguing that the term “historically important land area” unambiguously includes 
air rights: after all, at least for easements applying to air space above an existing 
structure, the land is already covered by a building. A taxpayer would also have 
trouble convincing a court that the term “certified historic structure” 
unambiguously includes air space above the structure. In one case, Tax Court 
Judge David Gustafson noted that “[i]t might be argued that the appearance of a 
structure is ‘preserved’ in an aesthetic sense by an easement that prevents vertical 
development above its existing height,” but Judge Gustafson’s opinion does not 
suggest that this argument would prevail. (He ultimately concluded that the 
deduction claim failed on other grounds, even “[a]ssuming arguendo that there 
can be circumstances in which an ‘air rights’ easement accomplishes the 
preservation of a ‘structure.’”168) And if there is any ambiguity as to whether an 
air rights easement “preserv[es]” a historic “structure,” the only question in court 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14 (d)(5)(v), example 1. 
163 See, e.g., Herman v. Comm'r, No. 14005-07, T.C. Memo 2009-205, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo 
LEXIS 209 (2009). 
164 See FY 2014 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 162. 
165 FY 2014 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 162. 
166 See FY 2015 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 196; FY 2016 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 188-89; 
FY 2017 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 216. 
167 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iv). 
168 Herman v. Comm'r, No. 14005-07, T.C. Memo 2009-205, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 209, 
at *23 (2009). 
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would be whether the Treasury regulation “is a ‘reasonable interpretation’ of the 
enacted text.”169 On that standard, it is difficult to see how Treasury would lose. 
 
7. Denying a Deduction for Payment of Punitive Damages 
 
 Section 162(a) allows taxpayers to claim a deduction for “all the ordinary 
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on 
any trade or business.”170 In 1969, Congress added a new section 162(f) that 
denies a deduction for “any fine or similar penalty paid to a government for the 
violation of any law.”171 The IRS, applying the rule of expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius, has interpreted the 1969 law to mean that payments of punitive damages 
are deductible, at least where such damages are “incurred by the taxpayer in the 
ordinary conduct of its business operations.”172 The Obama administration has 
called on Congress each year since 2009 to change this rule and deny a deduction 
for punitive damages paid upon a judgment or in settlement of a claim.173 The 
proposal likely has more to do with symbolism than with revenue: disallowing the 
deduction entirely would raise, according to Treasury’s most recent estimate, 
$741 million over a decade.174 
 In a 1996 law review article, Kimberly Pace, then a law clerk to a judge on 
the Federal Circuit, suggested that section 162 as it stands does not require the 
conclusion that punitive damages are deductible. 175  (Kimberly Pace is now 
Kimberly Moore, and she is no longer a clerk to a Federal Circuit judge but a 
Federal Circuit judge herself.) Pace’s article pointed to two paths that Treasury 
and the IRS might follow if they sought to argue against deductibility. First, Pace 
suggested that payments of punitive damages might fall within the ambit of 
section 162(f): they may amount to a “fine or similar penalty paid to a government 
for the violation of any law.”176 This argument runs into the obvious obstacle that 
punitive damages are generally paid to private plaintiffs and not “paid to a 
government,” although there are important exceptions. Certain statutes, such as 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980 (the “Superfund” law), allow the federal government to seek punitive 
damages.177 When punitive damages are paid to a federal or state government 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 58 (2011). 
170 26 U.S.C. § 162(a). 
171 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 516(c)(2)(A), 83 Stat. 488. 
172 Rev. Rul. 80-221, 1980-2 C.B. 57. 
173 See FY 2010 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 117; FY 2011 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 95; FY 
2012 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 63; FY 2013 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 139; FY 2014 
Greenbook, supra note 33, at 95; FY 2015 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 101; FY 2016 
Greenbook, supra note 33, at 116; FY 2017 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 111. 
174 FY 2017 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 267 tbl. 
175 Kimberly A. Pace, The Tax Deductibility of Punitive Damage Payments: Who Should 
Ultimately Bear the Burden for Corporate Misconduct?, 47 Ala. L. Rev. 825 (1996). 
176 Id. at 872-78. 
177 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3); see also, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2207(a) (if Secretary of Defense finds that 
contractor “offered or gave any gratuity . . . to an officer, official, or employee of the United States 
to obtain a contract or favorable treatment . . . concerning the . . . contract,” United States “is 
entitled to exemplary damages in an amount at least three, but not more than 10 . . . , times the 
cost incurred by the contractor in giving gratuities”); 33 U.S.C. § 1514(c) (punitive damages 
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plaintiff, the IRS might reasonably argue that such damages are a “penalty . . . for 
the violation of the law” and thus the section 162(f) exception applies. Moreover, 
seven states currently have “split-recovery” statutes providing for partial payment 
of punitive damages awards to state funds.178 The IRS might argue (again, quite 
reasonably) that the portion of punitive damages awards payable to the state is 
nondeductible for federal tax purposes.179  
 Another possible—though more controversial—approach would be for 
Treasury and the IRS to argue that punitive damages are not “ordinary and 
necessary” business expenses under section 162(a). As the Supreme Court recently 
noted, “[p]unitive damages have long been an available remedy at common law 
for wanton, willful, or outrageous conduct.” 180  Pace asks: “How could a 
corporation claim, or a court hold, that behavior which rises to that egregious 
level is a necessary part of doing business, or that such an expense is an ordinary, 
unavoidable part of business?”181 Note, moreover, that if Treasury promulgated 
regulations interpreting section 162 to disallow a deduction for punitive damages, 
the relevant question under Chevron and Mayo Foundation would be whether 
Treasury’s interpretation of the statutory language is “permissible”—not whether 
Treasury’s interpretation of the statutory language is the best reading of the text. 
 To be sure, the argument that Treasury has authority to disallow 
deductions for punitive damages under section 162 is far from airtight. In addition 
to the expressio unius implication from section 162(f), the Senate Finance 
Committee report accompanying the 1969 law is inconvenient: the report states 
that the statutory exceptions to the general rule of deductibility under section 162 
are “intended to be all inclusive.”182 Treasury might argue that the expressio unius 
canon is a guide rather than an ironclad rule183 and that one-house legislative 
history is not determinative.184 In any event, we do not know whether Treasury 
would prevail on this point because Treasury has not yet tried.  
  
F. Cases of Congressional Action  
 
 The examples above all were instances in which the President asked 
Congress for a legislative change instead of proceeding through regulation and 
Congress rebuffed the President’s request. The Greenbook is not, however, an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
payable to the United States for willful violation of statutes and regulations related to deepwater 
ports). 
178 Skyler M. Sanders, Note, Uncle Sam and the Partitioning Punitive Problem: A Federal Split-
Recovery Statute or a Federal Tax?, 40 Pepp. L. Rev. 785, 833-35 app. A (2013). 
179 See Pace, supra note 175, at 876. 
180 Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 409 (2009). 
181 Pace, supra note 175, at 879-80. 
182 Senate Comm. on Finance, Tax Reform Act of 1969, S. Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 
274 (1969).  
183 See, e.g., Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) (“[T]he canon expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius does not apply to every statutory listing or grouping; it has force only when the 
items expressed are members of an ‘associated group or series,’ justifying the inference that items 
not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence.”). 
184 See, e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 150 n.4 (2002) (“a single 
Committee Report from one House of a politically divided Congress . . . is a rather slender reed”). 
The 91st Congress was not politically divided, but a court disinclined to follow legislative history 
could no doubt find reason to disregard such history here. 
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entirely empty exercise: sometimes Congress does act on the President’s 
proposals—including proposals that the President, through Treasury and the IRS, 
could have implemented on his own. This section discusses some instances in 
which Congress has adopted Greenbook proposals that the administration likely 
could have implemented via regulation.  
 
 1. Preventing Taxpayers from “Splitting” Foreign Income and Foreign Tax Credits 
 
 One such example involves the “splitting” of foreign income and foreign 
tax credits. The “technical taxpayer rule,” promulgated by the Treasury 
Department in 1983, provides that the person who can claim the foreign tax 
credit is “the person on whom foreign law imposes legal liability for such tax,” 
even if another person actually pays the tax.185 Until recently, the technical 
taxpayer rule allowed a U.S. taxpayer to claim a foreign tax credit for the current 
year even though the income on which that foreign tax was paid might not be 
subject to U.S. income tax until a future year (or, in some cases, might never be 
subject to U.S. income). In a typical “splitting” arrangement, a U.S. corporation 
(the grandparent) would establish an entity in Luxembourg (the parent) that would 
be disregarded under U.S. check-the-box rules; however, the parent would qualify 
as a corporation for Luxembourg tax purposes. The parent, in turn, would own 
another Luxembourg entity (the child), which would generate income subject to 
tax in Luxembourg. Since Luxembourg law imposes legal liability for the tax on 
the parent entity rather than the child corporation, the parent entity would be 
considered the “technical taxpayer” under the Treasury rule. Because the parent 
entity was a disregarded entity under the U.S. check-the-box regime, the U.S. 
grandparent would be able to claim the foreign tax credit. But the income earned 
by the child corporation would not be subject to U.S. tax unless and until it was 
repatriated. The arrangement thus allowed the U.S. grandparent to split the 
foreign tax credit (which it would claim immediately) from the corresponding 
income (on which it potentially could defer U.S. tax indefinitely).186 
 The Treasury Department under President George W. Bush proposed 
regulations addressing credit splitting arrangements, but the Treasury 
Department did not finalize those regulations.187 Then in the fiscal year 2010 
Greenbook, President Obama asked Congress to pass legislation to prevent credit 
splitting, even though the opportunity for splitting was an opportunity created by 
the Treasury Department’s own technical taxpayer rule rather than by statute.188 
At the time, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation asked “whether 
congressional action is necessary” or “whether, instead, the IRS and Treasury 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(f); see Treas. Dec. 7918, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,272 (Oct. 12, 1983). 
186 See Guardian Industries Corp. v. United States, 477 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that 
the U.S. grandparent corporation could claim an immediate foreign tax credit under similar 
circumstances). 
187 See 71 Fed. Reg. 44,240 (Aug. 4, 2006). 
188 See FY 2010 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 117; FY 2011 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 95; FY 
2012 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 63; FY 2013 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 139; FY 2014 
Greenbook, supra note 33, at 95; FY 2015 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 101; FY 2016 
Greenbook, supra note 33, at 116; FY 2017 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 111. 
188 FY 2017 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 265 tbl.1. 
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Department could simply finalize the proposed regulations in the desired 
form.” 189  Nonetheless, Congress passed—and President Obama signed—
legislation providing that taxpayers cannot claim a foreign tax credit until the 
related income is taken into account.190 
 
 2. Matching OID Deductions with Income Inclusions 
 
 The Deficit Reduction Act of 1981 amended the statutory rules regarding 
original issue discount to add a special rule for OID on obligations to related 
foreign persons. The amendment prevented the obligor (i.e., borrower) from 
claiming a deduction until the obligee (i.e., lender) has been paid.191 In January 
1993, shortly before President George H.W. Bush left office, the Treasury 
Department finalized regulations carving out an exemption from the special rule 
for cases in which the related foreign person is a foreign personal holding 
company (FPHC), a controlled foreign corporation (CFC), or a passive foreign 
investment company (PFIC). The 1993 rule allowed a taxpayer to claim a 
deduction for OID as of the day on which a corresponding amount is includible in 
the income of the FPHC, CFC, or PFIC, without waiting until the amount is 
paid.192 However, an amount may be includible in the income of an FPHC, CFC, 
or PFIC before it is includible in the income of the entity’s U.S. owners. This 
meant that U.S. taxpayers, in some cases, could claim a deduction for OID on 
debt to a related foreign person even though no money changed hands and no 
other U.S. taxpayer included that amount in income.193 
 Since the opportunity for mismatch of deductions and income inclusions 
had been created by a Treasury regulation, the Clinton administration could have 
prevented mismatch by rescinding that regulation. Instead, the Clinton 
administration asked Congress in the Greenbooks for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 
to override the Treasury rule by statute.194 Congress took no action for several 
years. Ultimately, the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 did away with 
exemption for obligations to CFCs and PFICs; now, taxpayers can only claim 
deductions for OID on obligations to related CFCs and PFICs when a 
corresponding amount is included in the income of a U.S. person who owns stock 
in the CFC or PFIC.195 
 
 3. Requiring Information Reporting on Payments to Corporations 
 
 Since 1954, section 6041 of the Code has imposed information reporting 
requirements with respect to payments of $600 or more in the course of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax’n, JCS-4-09, Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in 
the President’s Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Proposal—Part Three: Provisions Related to the Taxation 
of Cross-Border Income and Investment 100 (Sept. 2009). 
190 Pub. L. No. 111-226, § 211(a), 124 Stat. 2394 (2010). 
191 Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 128(c), 98 Stat. 494, 654; see 26 U.S.C. § 163(e)(3)(A). 
192 See Treas. Dec. 8465, 58 Fed. Reg. 235 (Jan. 5, 1993).  
193 Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax’n, JCS-2-00, Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in 
the President’s Fiscal Year 2001 Budget Proposal 315-17 (Mar. 6, 2000). 
194 FY 2000 Greenbook, supra note 144, at 114; FY 2001 Greenbook, supra note 144, at 133-34. 
195 Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 841, 118 Stat. 1418, 1597 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 163(e)(3)(B)(i)). The 
2004 Act also eliminated the FPHC status for future tax years. 
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taxpayer’s trade or business. Specifically, section 6041 states that “[a]ll persons 
engaged in a trade or business and making payment in the course of such trade or 
business to another person . . . of $600 or more in any taxable year . . . shall 
render a true and accurate return” notifying the IRS of the amount of the 
payment and the name and address of the recipient.196 By its terms, the reporting 
requirement covers payments made to corporations; the Code has long defined 
“person” to include “an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, 
company or corporation.”197 However, Treasury regulations dating back to 1960 
carved out an exemption for “[p]ayments of any type made to corporations.”198 
 The reporting exemption for payments to corporations opened up 
opportunities for tax evasion. As the National Taxpayer Advocate noted in her 
2007 annual report to Congress, “[o]ne possible justification for the corporate 
exception to the information reporting requirement is that large corporations are 
less likely to underreport income than sole proprietors because they must account 
to unrelated shareholders for business earnings and expenses,” but “these 
safeguards may not be present in many closely-held corporations.” 199  The 
Taxpayer Advocate called for repeal of the exemption, and the Treasury 
Department under President George W. Bush agreed. But rather than instructing 
his Treasury Department to repeal the regulations that created the exemption, 
President Bush instead asked Congress to act legislatively.200  
 Why would the President ask Congress to change the tax statutes in order 
to require reporting for payments of $600 or more to corporations, when a statute 
requiring reporting for such payments had been on the books for more than a 
half-century? The Bush administration briefly addressed this question in the 
Greenbook for fiscal year 2009: “Although the exception for information 
reporting to corporations is set forth in existing regulations, because it has been in 
place for many years and because Congress, during that time period, has made 
numerous changes to the information reporting rules, elimination of the exception 
should be made by legislative change.”201 The Bush administration estimated that 
repeal of the exemption would raise more than $8.2 billion in revenue over the 
next decade due to greater compliance, but it declined to take action without 
congressional cooperation.202 
 Ultimately, Congress did eliminate the exemption for payments to 
corporations as part of the Affordable Care Act of 2010. The ACA added a new 
subsection (i) to section 6041, which read: “Notwithstanding any regulation 
prescribed by the Secretary before the date of the enactment of this subsection, for 
purposes of this section the term ‘person’ includes any corporation that is not an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 26 U.S.C. § 6041(a); see Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 68A Stat. 3, 745. 
197 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a); see Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 68A Stat. 3, 911. 
198 26 C.F.R. § 1.6041-3(c) (1960). The 1960 regulations made an exception to the exception (i.e., 
required reporting for) certain rebates and refunds to patrons. 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.6044, 1.6044-1 
(1960). Nonetheless, the vast majority of payments to corporations were exempt from reporting 
under the 1960 rules.  
199 1 Taxpayer Advocate Serv., 2007 Annual Report to Congress 495 (2007). 
200 See U.S. Dep’t of the Treaury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2009 
Revenue Proposals 63 (Feb. 2008). 
201 Id. 
202 See id. 
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organization exempt from tax under section 501(a).”203 But subsection (i) was 
short-lived: Congress repealed it the following year; President Obama signed the 
repeal legislation; and payments to corporations remain exempt from the section 
6041 reporting requirement.204 
 
G. Back on the Regulatory Road 
 
 The inclusion of a proposal in the Greenbook does not, of course, preclude 
the same President or a successor from implementing the proposal via executive 
action. In at least three cases, Treasury and IRS have used their authority under 
existing statutes to implement a Greenbook proposal that previous Congresses 
rebuffed. 
 
 1.  Treating Signing Bonuses as “Wages” for FICA Taxes 
 
 Since 1954, section 3402 has required employers to withhold tax on 
payments of “wages.”205 In 1958, the IRS issued a revenue ruling that addressed 
the application of section 3402 to bonus payments made to baseball players. The 
IRS concluded that a bonus “paid to a new player solely for signing his first 
contract, without any requirement of subsequent service,” did not constitute 
“wages,” and thus the baseball club was not required to withhold tax on the 
bonus.206 The Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) uses a definition of 
“wages” similar to the withholding statute, and thus the 1958 ruling indicated that 
signing bonuses would be exempt from Social Security and Medicare taxes as well 
if there was no subsequent-service requirement.207 
 In the Greenbooks for fiscal years 2000 and 2001, the Clinton 
administration included a proposal that would effectively override the 1958 
revenue ruling and clarify that signing bonuses are “wages” for withholding and 
employment tax purposes, regardless of whether the bonus is conditioned on 
subsequent service.208 However, congressional action is generally not necessary to 
reverse a revenue ruling; the IRS can simply revoke the revenue ruling and issue a 
new one. Indeed, the IRS did exactly that in 2004: it issued a new revenue ruling 
revoking the 1958 decision and interpreting the term “wages” to include signing 
bonuses broadly. The 2004 ruling provided a straightforward justification for the 
IRS’s revised interpretation: “amounts an employer pays an employee as 
remuneration for employment are wages”; “[e]mployment encompasses the 
establishment . . . of the employer-employee relationship”; so signing bonuses are 
wages if paid “in connection with establishing the employer-employee 
relationship.”209 The revenue ruling accomplished what the Greenbook proposal 
would have: signing bonuses are now considered wages for FICA and withholding 
purposes even if the bonuses are not contingent upon subsequent service. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9006(a), 124 Stat. 148, 855 (2010). 
204 Pub. L. No. 112-9, § 2(a), 125 Stat. 36, 36 (2011). 
205 26 U.S.C. § 3402. 
206 Rev. Rul. 58-145, 1958-1 C.B. 360. 
207 See 26 U.S.C. § 3121. 
208 FY 2000 Greenbook, supra note 144, at 183; FY 2001 Greenbook, supra note 144, at 191-92. 
209 Rev. Rul. 2004-109, 2004-2 C.B. 958. 
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 The signing bonus change likely had a modest effect on revenues: 
according to the Clinton administration’s last Greenbook, a reform along the 
same lines as the 2004 IRS ruling would raise receipts by $28 million over a 
decade.210 What is more remarkable is how rare it was before the Obama 
administration’s April 2016 inversion actions for Treasury to respond to the rebuff 
of a Greenbook request by implementing the measure via regulation. 
 
 2. Restricting Earnings Stripping by Expatriated Entities After an Inversion 
 
 Section 7874, enacted in 2004, sets forth specific rules that apply when a 
U.S. corporation is acquired by a foreign corporation and, after the acquisition, at 
least 60% of the stock of the combined entity is held by shareholders of the former 
U.S. corporation.211 The U.S. corporation—now a subsidiary of the foreign 
parent—is treated as an “expatriated entity,” and for the first 10 years after the 
inversion it is limited in its ability to claim deductions and credits for U.S. tax 
purposes.212 These limitations do not, however, apply when the new multinational 
group created by combining the foreign parent and the U.S. corporation has 
“substantial business activities in the foreign country in which [the foreign parent] 
is created or organized, when compared to the [group’s] total business 
activities.”213 Moreover, the limitations do little to prevent the U.S. subsidiary 
from reducing its U.S. tax liabilities through “earnings stripping” following an 
inversion. To see how an earnings-stripping strategy might work, imagine that a 
U.S. corporation inverts by merging with an Irish corporation and then issues a 
note as a dividend to the new Irish parent; the U.S. corporation would then pay 
interest on the note to the Irish parent and deduct those interest payments from 
U.S. income. The United States would impose a 15% withholding tax on interest 
payments to the Irish parent,214 but the Irish parent would then claim a credit to 
offset the 12.5% Irish corporate tax. The net result would be to reduce the 
multinational group’s tax rate on U.S. income from 35% (the top U.S. corporate 
income tax rate) to 15% (the U.S. withholding rate).215 
 The Obama administration took a number of relatively modest regulatory 
measures to limit corporate inversions prior to 2016.216 Meanwhile, the President 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 FY 2001 Greenbook, supra note 144, at tbl. 
211 26 U.S.C. § 7874(a)(2). The provision also applies to the acquisition of U.S. partnerships by 
foreign corporations. 
212 § 7874(a)(1), (d), (e). If shareholders of the former domestic corporation hold 80% or more of 
the combined entity after the inversion, the transaction is essentially disregarded and the foreign 
parent is subject to U.S. tax as if it were a U.S. corporation. See § 7874(b). 
213 § 7874(a)(2)(B)(iii). 
214 Interval Revenue Serv., Publication 901 tbl.1, 
https://www.irs.gov/publications/p901/ar02.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2016). 
215 Section 163(j) is designed to limit earnings stripping, but in practice it has failed to prevent U.S. 
corporations from using related party debt to zero out their U.S. income tax liabilities following an 
inversion. See Jim A. Seida & William F. Wempe, Effective Tax Rate Changes and Earnings 
Stripping Following Corporate Inversion, 57 Nat’l Tax J. 805, 807 (2004); U.S. Dep’t of the 
Treasury, Report to the Congress on Earnings Stripping, Transfer Pricing and U.S. Income Tax 
Treaties 29 (2007). 
216 In 2012, the Treasury Department promulgated temporary regulations interpreting the term 
“substantial business activities” in section 7874 to mean that at least 25% of the employees, assets, 
and income of the multinational group must be located in or derived from the relevant foreign 
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asked Congress to act to pass legislation limiting earnings stripping in connection 
with corporate inversions. President Obama’s first Greenbook included a proposal 
that would limit the ability of “expatriated entities” to engage in earnings-
stripping transactions with their foreign affiliates; under that proposal, a U.S. 
corporation that engages in an inversion could not reduce its taxable income by 
more than 25% through intragroup debt. 217  For the next four years, the 
President’s Greenbook included the same proposal;218 every time, Congress failed 
to act. Meanwhile, more than two dozen U.S. corporations completed inversion 
transactions.219 
 Outside the administration, several tax lawyers and academics—most 
notably Harvard Law School lecturer Stephen Shay—noted that Treasury 
already had ample authority to limit earnings stripping by U.S. corporations that 
invert.220 One important source of Executive Branch authority is section 385 of 
the Code, which authorizes the Treasury Secretary to “prescribe such regulations 
as may be necessary or appropriate” to determine whether an interest in a 
corporation should be treated as debt or equity.221 Shay argued that Treasury 
could use its authority under section 385 to classify as “equity” any debt issued by 
a U.S. corporation to a foreign affiliate as part of an earnings-stripping 
transaction.222 
 In April 2016, the Obama administration took up a version of Shay’s 
proposal. (As noted in the introduction, the action came after pharmaceutical 
giant Pfizer announced plans to merge with Irish counterpart Allergan—a 
transaction that Pfizer said would reduce its tax bill by $1 billion a year.223) 
Perhaps most significantly, the Treasury Department published proposed 
regulations providing that when a U.S. corporation issues a note to a foreign 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
country. See Treas. Dec. 9592, 77 Fed. Reg. 34,785 (June 12, 2012). The 25% figure marked a 
change from temporary regulations promulgated by the Bush Treasury Department in 2006 that 
interpreted the term “substantial business activities” to mean at least 10% of employees, assets, and 
income. Treasury and the IRS promulgated additional rules regarding inversions in 2014 and 
2015, but none of these measures materially limited earnings stripping by inverted firms. See IRS 
Notice 2014-52; IRS Notice 2015-79. 
217 See FY 2010 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 33. 
218 FY 2011 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 46; FY 2012 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 47; FY 2013 
Greenbook, supra note 33, at 92; FY 2014 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 53. 
219 Jesse Drucker & Zachary R. Mider, Tax Inversion: How U.S. Companies Buy Tax Breaks, 
Bloomberg QuickTake (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/tax-
inversion. 
220 Stephen E. Shay, Mr. Secretary, Take the Tax Juice Out of Corporate Expatriations, Tax 
Notes, July 28, 2014, 
http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/features.nsf/Features/76D1FDB318A0435D85257D230050
CC38; see also Victor Fleischer, How Obama Can Stop Corporate Expatriations, for Now, N.Y. 
Times: Dealbook, Aug. 7, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/07/how-obama-can-
stop-corporate-expatriations-for-now; Steven M. Rosenthal, Professor Shay Got It Right: Treasury 
Can Slow Inversions, Tax Notes, Sept. 22, 2014, available at 
http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/features.nsf/Articles/EA003BE7503E72C785257D5B005321
29. 
221 26 U.S.C. § 385(a). 
222 See Shay, supra note 220, at __. 
223 See Michael Hiltzik, Pfizer Shows That Its Allergan Merger Was Only a Tax Dodge, L.A. 
Times, Apr. 6, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-pfizer-allergan-
20160406-snap-htmlstory.html. 
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affiliate as part of a dividend distribution, the note will be treated as equity rather 
than debt (and thus the U.S. corporation’s “interest” on the note will be 
nondeductible). 224  The proposed regulation and other temporary and final 
regulations promulgated in April 2016225 substantially limit the tax benefits for 
U.S. corporations that merge into foreign counterparts.  
  
 3. Curbing Valuation Discounts in Family Limited Partnerships 
 
 For decades, wealthy individuals have used “family limited partnerships” 
(FLPs) to avoid estate and gift taxes on transfers to children and other relatives. To 
see how taxpayers can accomplish this objective through FLPs, consider the 
following example: A mother forms a corporation to which she contributes $1. 
The mother then forms a limited partnership with herself as the limited partner 
and the corporation as the general partner; the limited partnership holds $100 in 
assets, with $1 from the corporation and $99 directly from the mother. The 
mother then transfers half her limited partnership interest to her son and half to 
her daughter. But instead of reporting the value of the gift to each child as $49.50 
(half of $99), the mother reports that the value of each gift is $33 (two-thirds of 
$49.50). She claims that the value of each child’s limited partnership interest is less 
than $49.50 because neither child can force the partnership to be liquidated: the 
corporation, as the general partner, remains in charge.226 This maneuver allows 
the mother to transfer more to her children than she otherwise could without 
incurring gift tax liabilities.   
 Section 2704, enacted in 1990, authorizes the Treasury Secretary to 
promulgate regulations disregarding restrictions on liquidation of a partnership in 
determining the amount of a gift if the restriction “does not ultimately reduce the 
value of such interest to the transferee.”227 Yet instead of exercising this authority 
initially, the Obama administration sought congressional support for changes to 
the FLP rules. A proposal in the President’s Greenbook for fiscal year 2013 would 
have curbed valuation discounts for FLP interests where another family member 
has the authority to lift any restrictions on liquidation. 228  The Treasury 
Department estimated that the change would save more than $18 billion over the 
course of a decade.229  
 The Obama administration’s FLP proposal went nowhere in Congress. 
Finally, in August 2016, the Treasury Department published proposed regulations 
that utilize the authority granted to Treasury under section 2704.230 The details of 
the proposal lie beyond the scope of this article, but suffice it to say (as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Treatment of Certain Interests in Corporations as Stock or Indebtedness: Proposed Rule, 81 
Fed. Reg. 20912 (Apr. 8, 2016). 
225 See Inversions and Related Transactions: Final and Temporary Regulations, Treas. Dec. 9761, 
81 Fed. Reg. 20858 (Apr. 8, 2016). 
226 For a similar example, see Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Family Limited 
Partnerships: Discounts, Options, and Disappearing Value, 6 Fla. Tax. Rev. 649, 650-51 (2004). 
227 26 U.S.C. § 2704(b)(4). 
228 See FY 2013 Greenbook, supra note 33, at 79. 
229 Id. at 202 tbl.1. 
230 Estate, Gift, and Generation-skipping Transfer Taxes; Restrictions on Liquidation of an 
Interest: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Public Hearing, 81 Fed. Reg. 51413 (Aug. 
4, 2016). 
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Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy announced in a blog post) that 
the new rules “significantly reduce the ability of [wealthy] taxpayers and their 
estates to use [FLP] techniques solely for the purpose of lowering their estate and 
gift taxes.”231 
 The Obama administration’s April 2016 actions on inversions and the 
August 2016 proposed rules on FLPs are important exceptions to the claim that 
the President rarely resorts to regulation when Congress rebuffs his requests for 
revenue-raising regulation. Yet as argued below,232 the timing of these measures is 
consistent with a model of executive-legislation interactions that also accounts for 
the general reluctance of President Obama and his predecessors to implement 
revenue-raising tax measures unilaterally. For now, keep in mind the facts that (a) 
the Obama administration ultimately did act without Congress to implement two 
important measures previously on the President’s legislative agenda and (b) these 
actions occurred in the last year of the President’s second term, at a time of 
legislative gridlock, and as polls and prediction markets showed a very high 
likelihood of the President’s party retaining the White House.233  
 
H. Congressional “Overrides” of Revenue Raising Regulations 
 
 Even when the President and his Treasury Department do decide to act 
unilaterally, that is not necessarily the end of the story. Congress still may seek to 
prevent Treasury from finalizing or implementing regulations. On several 
occasions, Congress has passed measures that stopped the Treasury Department 
from moving forward with a regulatory initiative. The year 1978 was a high 
watermark for congressional action of this sort. In that year, Congress passed 
legislation temporarily prohibiting Treasury from issuing regulations regarding 
the definition of “fringe benefits,”234 the deductibility of commuting expenses,235 
and the classification of workers as “employees” or “independent contractors” for 
employment tax purposes.236 (The moratorium on regulations addressing the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Mark J. Masur, Treasury Issues Proposed Regulations to Close Estate and Gift Tax Loophole, 
Treasury Notes (Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Treasury-Issues-
Proposed-Regulations-to-Close-Estate-and-Gift-Tax-Loophole.aspx. 
232 See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
233 See HuffPost Pollster, 2016 General Election: Trump vs. Clinton, 
http://elections.huffingtonpost.com/pollster/2016-general-election-trump-vs-clinton (last visited 
Aug. 15, 2016) (showing Hillary Clinton leading Donald Trump by 9 percentage points on April 4, 
2016, the date the inversion actions were announced, and by 8 percentage points on August 2, the 
date the proposed FLP rules were announced); Iowa Electronic Markets, Market Quotes: 
Pres16_WTA, https://iemweb.biz.uiowa.edu/quotes/Pres16_quotes.html (last visited Aug. 15, 
2016) (showing that the prediction-market odds of Clinton beating Trump were about 69% on 
April 4 and 73% on August 2).  
234 Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, § 1, 92 Stat. 996, 996. The moratorium was initially 
set to expire at the end of 1979 but was extended through 1983. See 26 U.S.C. § 61 note. 
235 Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, § 2, 92 Stat. 996, 996. The IRS had sought to limit the 
deductibility of certain commuting expenses in a 1976 revenue ruling. See Rev. Rul. 76-453, 1976-
2 C.B. 86. The 1978 legislation, as later amended, prevented the IRS from implementing the 
ruling until the end of May 1981. See 26 U.S.C. § 72 note. 
236 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 530, 92 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended at 26 
U.S.C.A. § 3401 note); see also William Hays Weissman, Nat’l Ass’n of Tax Reporting and Prof’l 
Mgmt., Section 530: Its History and Application in Light of the Federal Definition of the 
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employee/independent contractor distinction was later extended to be a 
permanent ban.237) Congress also enacted a prohibition on regulations regarding 
the timing of taxes on non-qualified deferred compensation plan payments in the 
private sector. 238 That measure was aimed at blocking an unpopular proposed 
Treasury regulation, 239  and the prohibition lasted for a quarter century. 240 
Similarly, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 imposed an 11-month moratorium on 
Treasury regulations regarding the definition of “limited partner” for purposes of 
federal self-employment income taxes. 241  And in December 2015, Congress 
passed an appropriations rider barring the Treasury Department from using any 
funds to finalize proposed regulations regarding the involvement of tax-exempt 
organizations in political campaigns.242 
 These congressional “overrides” might lead some readers to question 
whether the Executive Branch really has the authority to implement revenue-
raising measures on its own. Note, though, that in the 1978, 1997, and 2015 cases, 
the President signed the bill imposing a moratorium or ban on regulatory action. 
Presidents Carter (in 1978), Clinton (in 1997), and Obama (in 2015) were 
unwilling to use their veto power in order to defend the Treasury Department’s 
revenue-raising efforts. Of course, if the President had exercised his veto power in 
any of these instances, members of Congress might have sought to override the 
veto. However, veto overrides with respect to tax bills are rarer than lightning 
strikes: the last time that Congress overrode a President’s veto of tax-related 
legislation was in 1948, when Harry Truman was in the White House.243  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Employer-Employee Relationship for Federal Tax Purposes (Feb. 28, 2009), available at 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/irpac-br_530_relief_-_appendix_natrm_paper_09032009.pdf 
(discussing history of ban on employee/independent contractor regulations and revenue rulings). 
237 26 U.S.C.A. § 3401 note. 
238 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 132, 92 Stat. 2763, 2782. Specifically, the Revenue 
Act of 1978 said that “[t]he taxable year of inclusion in gross income of any amount covered by a 
private deferred compensation plan shall be determined in accordance with principles set forth in 
regulations, rulings, and judicial decisions . . . which were in effect on February 1” of that year. 
The statutory language effectively made any subsequent Treasury action on the subject null and 
void. 
239 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16, 43 Fed. Reg. 4638 (1978). 
240 See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 885, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004) 
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 409A); Michael Doran, Time To Start Over on Deferred Compensation, 
28 Va. Tax. Rev. 223, 224. 
241 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788, 882. The 1997 legislation 
came in response to a controversial notice of proposed rulemaking, see 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (Jan. 10, 
1997); rather than waiting for the 11-month period to pass, Treasury declined to finalize the 
proposed rules even after the moratorium ended. See Lucia Nasuti Smeal & Tad D. Ransopher, 
LLC Material Participation Policy Shift: New Regulations Focus on Management Rights, 2 J. 
Legal Issues & Cases in Bus. 1, 8 (2013). 
242 See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 127, 129 Stat. 2242, __ 
(2015). The regulations would have denied tax-exempt status to organizations that engage in 
“candidate-related political activity.” 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535 (Nov. 29, 2013). See generally Paul C. 
Barton, Confusion Over Judging Political Activity Still Reigns at IRS, Tax Notes, Feb. 8, 2016, 
http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/features.nsf/Features/644E0F632E1B1E2C85257F5300477F
1A.  
243 Revenue Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 110; see U.S. Senate, Summaries of Bills Vetoed—1789-Present, 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/Legislation/Vetoes/vetoCounts.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2016). 
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 To be sure, Congress has other tools to express its opposition to revenue-
raising executive action—and has ways aside from a veto override to punish the 
President for proceeding unilaterally. The Senate can refuse to confirm the 
President’s nominees for Treasury posts244 and also can refuse to ratify tax treaties 
that the President supports.245 Moreover, both the House and the Senate can 
summon the administration’s top tax officials before committees for time-
consuming hearings. Note, though, tax is not unique in this regard: in other areas, 
Congress likewise can hold up nominations and haul administration officials 
before oversight committees for grueling hearings.246 And yet recent Presidents 
have not been reluctant to proceed unilaterally in the face of potential 
congressional opposition—and retaliation—on a wide range of non-tax matters. 
 
I. The Tax Cutter in Chief 
 
  Some of the examples above involved a President asking Congress to 
override a prior administration’s action that had tested the limits of executive 
authority. Consider the decision by the first Bush administration to exempt 
obligations to FPHCs, CFCs, and PFICs from the rules otherwise applicable to 
OID debt (a decision ultimately overridden by Congress in 2004).247 Treasury 
acknowledged in the notice announcing the proposed regulation that the special 
treatment of FPHCs, CFCs, and PFICs was “a substantial exception to the 
generally applicable rule” for OID debt, but it cited no statutory provision 
supporting such an exception, nor did it point to any part of the relevant 
legislative history indicating that the exemption was consistent with congressional 
intent.248 
 Several other Treasury actions addressed above seem to fit this mold: 
examples include the exemption from section 6041 for corporations carved out by 
the Treasury Department under President Eisenhower,249 the safe harbor for dual 
capacity taxpayers created by the Treasury Department under President 
Reagan,250 and—arguably—the decision by the Treasury Department at the start 
of the Clinton administration allowing carried interest profits to be taxed at 
preferential rates.251 For present purposes, I will focus on three Treasury actions—
one from each of the past three administrations—that represent particularly bold 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 See Shamik Trivedi, Top Tax Nominees in Limbo, with Politics To Blame, 134 Tax Notes 522 
(Jan. 30, 2012) (noting that for the first three years of the Obama presidency, the Senate refused to 
confirm President Obama’s nominees to the posts of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax 
Policy and Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Justice Department’s Tax Division). 
245 Indeed, Senate rules empower a single Senator to effectively block a nomination or treaty from 
going through. See Ryan Finley & William Hoke, Tax Treaty Awaiting U.S. Senate Vote Face 
Uncertain Future, Tax Analysts Worldwide Tax Daily, Nov. 12, 2015 (noting that Senator Rand 
Paul, a Kentucky Republican, has held up eight pending tax treaties due to concerns about 
taxpayer privacy protections). 
246 The need for Senate ratification of tax treaties is one distinguishing feature of tax law—there is 
no obvious equivalent with respect to, e.g., health or labor policy.   
247 See supra Section I.F.2. 
248 Deduction of Amounts Owed to Related Foreign Persons—Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 56 
Fed. Reg. 11531 (Mar. 19, 1991). 
249 See supra text accompanying notes 196-198. 
250 See supra text accompanying notes 130-135. 
251 See supra text accompanying note 101. 
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assertions of executive power in a taxpayer-friendly direction. The first, alluded to 
above, is the 1996 rule promulgated by Treasury under President Clinton 
establishing the check-the-box regime. The second is a set of rules promulgated 
under the second President Bush and commonly known as the “INDOPCO 
regulations” though perhaps better termed the “anti-INDOPCO regulations” 
because they effectively overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in INDOPCO, Inc. 
v. Commissioner. 252  The third is the Treasury Department’s decision under 
President Obama allowing General Motors to make use of $45 billion in net 
operating loss carryforwards despite statutory restrictions that would seem to go 
against General Motors’ position.   
 
 1. The Clinton Administration’s Check-the-Box Regulations 
 
 Since 1924, federal tax law has defined the term “corporation” as 
“includ[ing] associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance companies.”253 
While that definition is somewhat Delphic, the Supreme Court shed light on the 
scope of the term “corporation” in the 1935 case Morrissey v. Commissioner.254 The 
“salient features” of a corporation, according to Morrissey, are (1) perpetual life, (2) 
centralized management, (3) free transferability of beneficial interests “without 
affecting the continuity of the enterprise,” and (4) limited liability for owners.255 A 
quarter century after Morrissey, the Treasury Department under President 
Eisenhower promulgated regulations codifying the Morrissey factors.256 This test 
governed for the next three dozen years. 
 In 1996, however, the Clinton administration announced a dramatic 
change to the decades-old regime. The Treasury Department promulgated 
regulations allowing unincorporated business entities other than publicly traded 
enterprises to elect whether or not they will be taxed as corporations. Some 
foreign business entities are treated as “per se corporations” under check-the-box, 
but a wide variety of foreign entities enjoy freedom of choice.257 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 590 U.S. 79 (1992). 
253 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(3). 
254 296 U.S. 344 (1935). 
255 Id. at 359; see Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 Bos. U. L. 
Rev. 185, 216 (2004). Note that Polsky’s article preceded two Supreme Court decisions that likely 
place Treasury’s actions on firmer ground. The first, National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. 
Brand X Internet Services, held that “[a] court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an 
agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds 
that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room 
for agency discretion.” 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). Then in 2011, the Court clarified in Mayo that 
the Chevron framework applies to Treasury regulations. See supra Section I.C. The combination of 
holdings would seem to suggest that the Supreme Court’s prior interpretations of the tax code in 
Morrissey and INDOPCO can be trumped by subsequent Treasury pronouncements. The argument 
in text here, though, is not that the check-the-box and INDOPCO regulations are illegal. Rather, 
the argument is that at the time they were issued these regulations represented much more robust 
assertions of executive authority than is typical in the revenue-raising context. 
256 Treas. Dec. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409. The 1960 regulations stated that an enterprise would only 
be treated as a corporation if it exhibited at least three of the four corporate factors. On whether 
the 1960 regulations are themselves consistent with Morrissey, see Polsky, supra note 255, at 217-18. 
257 61 Fed. Reg. 66584 (Dec. 18, 1996). Foreign entities that provide limited liability for their 
owners are treated as corporations by default, but can opt out of corporation status. 
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 Several commentators have questioned Treasury’s authority to 
promulgate the check-the-box rules.258 The Supreme Court has held that “[o]nce 
we have determined a statute’s meaning,” that interpretation becomes “settled 
law,” and agencies are no longer entitled to deference if they adopt a conflicting 
interpretation of the same provision. 259  Morrissey, moreover, interpreted the 
meaning of the term “corporation” for purposes of the tax statutes; that 
interpretation would now seem to be “settled law.” Two courts of appeals, though, 
have held that the check-the-box regulations do not contravene Morrissey,260 
largely laying the issue to rest. But valid or not, the check-the-box regulations 
certainly represent a robust exercise of executive authority. In this regard, they 
stand in stark contrast to the modus operandi of past Presidents with respect to 
revenue-raising measures. 
 
 2. The Bush Administration’s INDOPCO Regulations 
 
 The Supreme Court’s INDOPCO decision construed Code provisions 
relating to the deductibility of business expenses. 261  In INDOPCO itself, a 
corporation formerly known as National Starch claimed deductions for fees paid 
to investment bankers and lawyers in connection with a friendly takeover of 
National Starch by Unilever. The Supreme Court ruled that the fees were capital 
expenditures rather than immediately deductible business expenses. The Court’s 
narrow holding was that expenses “incurred for the purpose of changing the 
corporate structure for the benefit of future operations” must be capitalized;262 the 
broader implication of the INDOPCO decision was that taxpayers must capitalize 
expenditures made for the “betterment” of the their business over a period of time 
“somewhat longer than the current taxable year.”263 
 In 2004, a dozen years after INDOPCO, the Bush Treasury Department 
promulgated final regulations addressing the deductibility of amounts paid to 
create or acquire intangibles.264 In several respects, the regulations deviated from 
the INDOPCO decision in a “taxpayer-favorable” direction.265 For example, the 
regulations generally allow a taxpayer to immediately deduct amounts paid to 
create or acquire nonfinancial interests with a useful life of 12 months or less, even 
if the 12-month period extends over two taxable years.266 The 12-month rule 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Compare Polsky, supra note 255 (arguing that the regulations exceeded Treasury’s authority), 
with Victor E. Fleischer, Note, “If It Looks like a Duck”: Corporate Resemblance and Check-the-
Box Elective Tax Classification, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 918 (1996) (arguing the opposite). 
259 See, e.g., Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996). 
260 See McNamee v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 488 F.3d 100, 104-09 (2d Cir. 2007); Littriello v. 
United States, 484 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007). 
261 INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992); see 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (deduction for 
“ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any 
trade or business”); § 263(a)(1) (no deduction for “[a]ny amount paid out for new buildings or for 
permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate”). 
262 Id. at 89. 
263 Id. at 90. 
264 Treas. Dec. 9107, 69 Fed. Reg. 436 (Jan. 5, 2004). 
265 Ethan Yale, The Final INDOPCO Regulations, Tax Analysts, Oct. 25, 2004, at 435, 436. 
266 See 69 Fed. Reg. at 440. 
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opens the door to planning opportunities that were well recognized even at the 
time of the regulations.267 
 Just as the 1996 check-the-box regulations raised the question of whether 
Treasury could effectively overrule Morrissey, the 2004 regulations raised the 
question of whether Treasury could effectively overrule INDOPCO.268 Since the 
regulations are generally taxpayer-friendly, few potential litigants would have 
standing to challenge the validity of the 2004 rules.269 The point here, though, is 
not to question the validity of the INDOPCO regulations; it is to note the 
asymmetry with respect to revenue-raising and revenue-reducing regulations. 
Over the course of several administrations, the President and his Treasury 
Department have sought congressional support for revenue-raising measures 
while adopting taxpayer-friendly regulations on their own (even when those 
taxpayer-friendly regulations require relatively bold assertions of executive power).  
 
 3. The Obama Administration’s General Motors Decision 
 
 As a general rule, a company that incurs a net operating loss (NOL) in one 
year can claim that loss as a deduction from taxable income in a future year. 
Section 172 of the Code allows for NOL carryforwards over 20 years and NOL 
carrybacks over two years: that is, a taxpayer with a net operating loss in 2016 can 
use that loss to reduce its tax for 2014 or 2015 or for any year through 2036.270 
Section 382, however, limits the ability of a corporation to use NOLs following an 
ownership change. Most relevantly for present purposes, section 382(l)(5) applies 
when a corporation with NOLs goes through bankruptcy and the shareholders 
and creditors of the old corporation own at least 50% of the stock of the 
reorganized corporation. Under those circumstances, the new corporation can use 
the old corporation’s NOLs, provided that the new corporation does not undergo 
another “ownership change” in the next two years. If, however, the new 
corporation undergoes an ownership change in the two years following the 
bankruptcy reorganization, it loses all of its NOLs. 271  The definition of 
“ownership change” is somewhat complicated, but such a change will occur if one 
or more large shareholders (i.e., shareholders with more than 5% of the 
corporation’s stock) sell more than 50% of their stock in the corporation over the 
next two years.272 
 In October 2008, Congress passed and President Bush signed the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, which provided Treasury with authority 
to carry out the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP).273 In June of the 
following year, General Motors filed for bankruptcy protection in federal court. 
By that point, the U.S. Treasury was GM’s primary creditor, having acquired 
nearly $50 billion in GM senior debt through TARP. The bankruptcy court 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 See generally Calvin H. Johnson, Destroying Tax Base: The Proposed INDOPCO 
Capitalization Regulations, Tax Notes, June 2, 2003, at 1381. 
268 See Polsky, supra note 255, at 243-44. 
269 See id. at 244 n. 347, 245. 
270 26 U.S.C. § 172(a), (b)(1)(A). 
271 § 382(l)(5). 
272 § 382(g). 
273 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765. 
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quickly approved a sale of GM’s assets to a new corporation in which the U.S. 
Treasury would hold a 61% stake. The Canadian government would hold a 12% 
stake in the new corporation; the United Auto Workers would, through a trust, 
hold a 17.5% stake; and other unsecured creditors would hold the remaining stock 
in the new corporation. Because creditors of the old GM held at least half (indeed, 
all) of the stock in the new GM, section 382(l)(5) allowed the new GM to use the 
old GM’s $45 billion in NOLs.274 
 There was, however, one potential wrench in the plan: if Treasury sold its 
stock in GM in the next two years—or if Treasury sold some of its stock and other 
owners of the new GM sold their stock such that an “ownership change” 
occurred—the new GM would lose all of its NOLs. And, indeed, Treasury had 
every intention to sell its stake expeditiously.275 Treasury addressed this potential 
problem in January 2010 by issuing Notice 2010-2, which said that for stock and 
other financial instruments acquired by Treasury through TARP, any subsequent 
sale by Treasury would not trigger an “ownership change” under section 382.276 
With the swoop of a pen, GM’s section 382 problem went away.  
 Notice 2010-2 cited three sources of statutory authority. First, section 
382(m) authorizes the Treasury Secretary to “prescribe such regulations as may be 
necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section.”277 Second, 
section 7805(a) authorizes the Treasury Secretary to “prescribe all needful rules 
and regulations for the enforcement” of the Internal Revenue Code.278 Third, 
section 101(c)(5) of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act gives the Treasury 
Secretary the power to “issu[e] such regulations and other guidance as may be 
necessary or appropriate to define terms or carry out the authorities or purposes 
of this Act.”279 One can question whether these general grants of regulatory 
authority are sufficient to justify Notice 2010-2, though I will leave that debate to 
others.280 What seems clear is that the statutory delegations cited by Treasury in 
Notice 2010-2 are no more specific (and indeed, much less so) than the provisions 
that Treasury might cite as authority for regulations addressing carried interest,281 
lower-of-cost-or-market accounting,282 and valuation discounts for family limited 
partnerships283—all of which are cases in which the statutory grant of authority is 
quite explicit. Put differently, one might argue that Treasury lacked the statutory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Can the Treasury Exempt Its Own Companies from 
Tax? The $45 Billion GM NOL Carryforward, 1 Cato Papers on Pub. Pol’y 1, 7-9 (2011). 
275 See Zachary A. Goldfarb, U.S. To Sell Off Its Remaining GM Shares, Wash. Post, Dec. 19, 
2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/us-to-sell-off-500-million-remaining-
gm-shares/2012/12/19/6dfc345e-49fd-11e2-b6f0-e851e741d196_story.html (quoting Assistant 
Secretary of Treasury for Financial Stability Timothy Massad as saying that “[t]he government 
should not be in the business of owning stakes in private companies for an indefinite period of 
time”). 
276 Notice 2010-2, 2010-2 I.R.B. 251. 
277 26 U.S.C. § 382(m). 
278 § 7805(a). 
279 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 101(c)(5), 122 Stat. 
3765. 
280 See Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 274, Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law 
in the Administration of the Income Tax, 62 Duke L.J. 829, 846-47 (2012). 
281 See supra text accompanying notes 102-103. 
282 See supra text accompanying note 141. 
283 See supra text accompanying note 227. 
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authority to promulgate Notice 2010-2, but if one thinks that Treasury did have 
the statutory authority to promulgate Notice 2010-2 (as the Obama 
administration claims it did), then Treasury most certainly has the authority to 
implement the revenue-raising measures listed in Section I.E through executive 
action.284 
 What is especially remarkable about Notice 2010-2 is how clearly it 
contravened the expressed wishes of members of the then-current Congress. In 
the midst of the fall 2008 financial crisis, the Bush Treasury Department issued a 
similar notice—Notice 2008-83—that effectively exempted the banking industry 
from the section 382 limitations. 285  Notice 2008-83, unlike the Obama 
administration’s subsequent action addressing GM, asserted absolutely no 
statutory authority for such an exemption. The Washington Post quoted former 
Joint Committee on Taxation chief of staff George Yin as saying: “Did the 
Treasury Department have the authority to do this? I think almost every tax 
expert would agree that the answer is no.”286 But while the legal basis for Notice 
2008-83 was unclear, the intention behind Notice 2008-83 was unambiguous: 
Treasury wanted to attract a buyer for Wachovia, then the fourth-largest bank 
holding company in the country, which was on the brink of collapse. And it 
worked: three days after the notice, Wells Fargo stepped in to buy Wachovia and 
its built-in NOLs.287 
 The reaction from Congress was almost as rapid. Republican Senator 
Charles Grassley of Iowa called for the Treasury Inspector General to investigate 
the “facts and circumstances surrounding the issuance of the Notice.” 288 
Democratic Senator Charles Schumer of New York also wrote to Treasury 
officials expressing concerns about the action. 289  Then in February of the 
following year, Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009, which included a provision stating: 
 
Congress finds as follows:              
 (1) The delegation of authority to the Secretary of the Treasury 
under section 382(m) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 does not 
authorize the Secretary to provide exemptions or special rules that are 
restricted to particular industries or classes of taxpayers. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 Treasury separately took actions ensuring that Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Wells Fargo, 
Citigroup, and AIG would not lose NOLs as a result of financial crisis bailouts. See Ramseyer & 
Rasmusen, supra note 274, at 20-21. 
285 See Notice 2008-83, I.R.B. 2008-42 (Oct. 20, 2008). 
286 Amit R. Paley, A Quiet Windfall for U.S. Banks, Wash. Post, Nov. 10, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/11/09/AR2008110902155_pf.html. 
287 See Binyamin Applebaum, After Change in Tax Law, Wells Fargo Swoops In, Wash. Post, 
Oct. 4, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/10/03/AR2008100301042.html.  
288 Michael Scherer, The Silent Change to Section 382, Time, Nov. 15, 2008, 
http://swampland.time.com/2008/11/15/the-silent-change-to-section-382. 
289 Letter from Senator Charles E. Schumer to Secretary Henry Paulson, Department of the 
Treasury and Doug Shulman, IRS Commissioner (Oct. 30, 2008), available at 
http://bit.ly/1O2U4gm. 
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 (2) Internal Revenue Service Notice 2008-83 is inconsistent with 
the congressional intent in enacting such section 382(m).              
 (3) The legal authority to prescribe Internal Revenue Service 
Notice 2008-83 is doubtful.290 
 
 Acknowledging that “taxpayers should generally be able to rely on 
guidance issued by the Secretary of the Treasury,” Congress declared that Notice 
2008-83 would “have the force and effect of law with respect to any ownership 
change . . . occurring on or before January 16, 2009, and . . . shall have no force 
or effect with respect to any ownership change after such date.”291 Nonetheless, 
Notice 2010-2 extended the exemption from the section 382 limits to the GM 
transaction occurring four months after the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act became law. Whether or not Notice 2012-2 technically runs afoul of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, the contrast with revenue-raising 
regulations could not be more stark. Consider the example of Notice 98-11 above 
(the Clinton administration proposal to walk back check-the-box with respect to 
hybrid branches).292 In the Notice 98-11 case, Treasury withdrew a proposed 
revenue-raising regulation for which it had virtually uncontested statutory 
authority based on murmurs of congressional disapproval. In the Notice 2010-2 
case, Treasury went forward with a taxpayer-friendly regulatory action for which 
it had questionable authority notwithstanding shouts from Capitol Hill. To be 
sure, the financial crisis catalyzed (and perhaps justified) extraordinary measures. 
But the fact remains that Treasury has been willing to test the outer limits of its 
authority in one direction and not the other. 
 
II. Game Theory, Deficit Hawks, and Resource Constraints 
 
 Part I set forth the puzzle: Why does the President repeatedly ask Congress 
to enact revenue-raising measures that the Executive Branch already has the 
power to implement on its own—especially when it is clear that Congress will 
rebuff the President’s request? One potential answer is that statutes are more 
durable than regulations: regulations are easily reversible by the next 
administration (especially after the Brand X decision293) while the process of 
repealing a statute is considerably more cumbersome. So too, statutes are less 
likely to be overturned on judicial review than regulations: a regulation, after all, 
can be set aside if it is inconsistent with the authorizing statute, whereas a statute 
need only satisfy the requirements of the Constitution. Also, a President who acts 
unilaterally may face charges of presidential imperialism from the press and other 
thought leaders.294 While this last constraint has not prevented Presidents in 
recent years from engaging in robust exercises of executive authority, it may make 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1261(a), 123 Stat. 
115, 342-43. 
291 Id., § 1261(b), 123 Stat. at 343. 
292 See supra text accompanying notes 122-127. 
293 See supra note 67. 
294 See, e.g., Ross Douthat, Op-Ed, The Making of an Imperial President, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/23/opinion/sunday/ross-douthat-the-making-of-an-
imperial-president.html. 
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legislation a first-best option and unilateralism a second-best response to legislative 
gridlock. 
 The puzzle, then, is not why the President initially asks Congress to enact 
revenue-raising measures via legislation: in light of the considerations listed in the 
previous paragraph, the President’s preference for legislation over executive action 
might seem overdetermined. Rather, the puzzle is why the President fails to act 
after Congress already has rebuffed his requests. I do not claim to have found a 
single answer to the puzzle, and I doubt that a single answer exists. Instead, this 
part proposes three explanations and explores the implications of each. The three 
explanations, I argue, bring us closer to understanding patterns of presidential 
action and inaction in tax law. They do not, however, constitute a complete 
answer—individually or in combination. 
 Before proceeding further, a caveat is in order: the analysis below 
generally treats the President, Treasury, and the IRS as an undifferentiated whole. 
Of course, the Executive Branch—like Congress—is a they, not an it.295 IRS 
officials may have preferences that diverge from those of their counterparts at the 
Treasury Office of Tax Policy, and the top tax officials at Treasury may, in turn, 
have preferences that diverge from the President’s. 
 Why, then, treat the Executive Branch as the functional unit of analysis? 
First, the organizational structure of the Treasury Department (including the IRS, 
a bureau within Treasury) is both an independent and dependent variable. The 
regulation drafting process within Treasury may generate frictions that make it 
more difficult for the Executive Branch to take on a robust revenue-raising role, 
but at the same time, if the President had a strong interest in Treasury taking on a 
robust revenue-raising role, the regulation drafting process within Treasury might 
be much more streamlined. Analyzing the incentives of the President is a first step 
toward understanding why Treasury and the IRS are structured as they are. 
Second, the intra-agency component of the puzzle is a story in and of itself—a 
story that I hope to tell in an upcoming article but simply cannot fit within this 
one.   
 
A.  Taxation Across Two Branches: A Game-Theoretic Approach 
 
 This section uses public choice and game theory to generate a possible 
explanation to the puzzle presented in Part I. Subsection II.A.1 presents a simple 
model of presidential behavior. Subsection II.A.2 develops a game-theoretic 
framework for analyzing interactions between the President and Congress. 
Subsection II.A.3 incorporates ideological and doctrinal factors into the game-
theoretic framework. 
 
 1.  A Simple Model of Presidential Behavior 
 
 No single formula can capture all of the reasons why Presidents and 
members of Congress do what they do. But a serviceable first approximation is 
that politicians take actions for which the expected political benefits (B) exceed the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 
12 Int’l Rev. Law & Econ. 239 (1992). 
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expected political costs (C). The beneficiaries of regulation can reward a politician 
through votes, campaign contributions, political favors, and employment 
opportunities after the politician leaves office. The interests harmed by regulation 
channel votes, contributions, and favors to the politician’s opponent. To be sure, 
this first approximation is just that—an approximation: politicians also act for 
reasons unrelated to a political cost-benefit calculus.296 Yet even though not 
everyone in a position of power acts like Frank Underwood, 297 the basic model 
provides a useful set of analytical building blocks even if it does not describe every 
element of reality. 
 As noted above, in many circumstances Presidents have a choice between 
acting on their own and proposing legislation to Congress. When the President 
and Congress act jointly, voters may apportion credit and blame between the two 
branches. Let p represent the portion of credit (blame) for legislation that voters 
assign to the President, with 1-p representing the portion of credit (blame) for 
legislation that voters assign to Congress. Assume, for the sake of simplicity, that 
there are no veto overrides: any legislation passed by Congress must be signed by 
the President in order to become law.298 
 The introduction of a second branch does not (yet) alter the analysis 
significantly. If the President were the sole political actor, he would adopt 
regulations for which B > C. If he has to share credit and blame with Congress, he 
will support measures for which pB > pC. The set of regulations for which B > C is 
identical to the set of measures for which pB > pC. So long as the President’s 
proportion of credit is the same as his proportion of blame, then every regulation 
that he would support in the one-branch scenario is also a measure he will support 
in a two-branch world.   
 What about revenue-raising measures? I will assume for now that the only 
political benefit of raising revenue is the benefit that comes from spending that 
revenue. There may be cases in which voters affirmatively want other taxpayers to 
pay more;299 for now, my focus will be on the majority of cases where revenue-
raising measures yield only political costs and expenditures yield only political 
benefits. I will also assume that voters assign blame for revenue-raising measures 
to the political actors who enacted those measures, and will assign credit for 
expenditures to the political actors who approved the spending. So when the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296 See generally John F. Kennedy, Profiles in Courage (Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 1st 
ed., 2006) (1956). 
297 See House of Cards (Netflix 2013-2016). 
298 As previously noted, veto overrides with respect to tax legislation are exceedingly rare. See 
supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
299 One might think that earnings stripping—see infra Section I.E.2—would be one such case: 
Democrats and Republicans alike have criticized U.S. corporations that merge with foreign 
counterparts in an attempt to escape out from under the U.S. tax system. See, e.g., Kevin 
Drawbaugh & Emily Stephenson, Politicians Slam Tax-Avoiding Pfizer-Allergan Deal, Reuters, 
Nov. 24, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-allergan-m-a-pfizer-whitehouse-
idUSKBN0TC24820151124; Carolyn Y. Johnson & Renae Merle, Pfizer’s Tax-Avoiding 
Megamerger with Allergan Sparks Outcry, Wash. Post, Nov. 23, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/pfizers-tax-avoiding-megamerger-with-
allergan-sparks-outcry/2015/11/23/cced417c-9218-11e5-b5e4-279b4501e8a6_story.html. Note, 
though, that the Obama administration has not used the full measure of its executive power to 
crack down on earnings stripping by inverted firms. Perhaps this suggests that the earnings 
stripping case is not as exceptional as it initially appears. 
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President takes executive action that results in more revenue being raised, he 
bears all the political costs himself. However, he cannot spend the funds himself; 
spending measures must go through Congress. Thus, the President internalizes all 
the political costs, C, but only a portion of the political benefits, pB. 
 The model so far has incorporated assumptions that are concededly 
contestable. First, it assumes that voters and/or interest groups are sufficiently well 
informed that they know whether it was the President and Congress who raised 
their taxes or the President who did so on his own. This assumption may appear 
implausible as applied to the general mass of voters, who may have difficulty 
determining whether the President or Congress is responsible for a particular 
policy change.300 But the assumption is more viable with respect to some of the 
interest groups that benefit from specific features of the tax laws. For example, 
private equity managers who benefit from the taxation of carried interest profits at 
preferential rates have spent millions of dollars on sophisticated lobbying efforts 
and campaign contributions targeted at specific members of Congress and 
presidential candidates.301 The same is true for the multinational firms that benefit 
from check-the-box treatment of single-member foreign-incorporated entities.302 If 
the Obama administration took executive action to eliminate these features of the 
tax code, it is difficult to imagine that private equity managers and Fortune 500 
CEOs would be confused as to whether the President or Congress was to blame.  
 At the same time, the model assumes that voters and/or interest groups 
are not so sophisticated that they can attribute the credit for expenditures to the 
actor who facilitated those expenditures through revenue-raising measures. This 
assumption strikes me as quite plausible even as applied to the most sophisticated 
interest groups. It is virtually impossible to know where the marginal dollar in the 
federal budget goes. (What would Congress cut if it had $1 less—or even $10 
billion less?) It is doubtful that members of the House and Senate Appropriations 
Committees can answer that question—much less that anyone outside the Capitol 
office buildings can. For that reason, it seems unlikely that the beneficiary of a 
particular spending program will recognize that the money for that program came 
from a specific revenue-raising executive action. More plausibly, the beneficiary of 
the spending program will assign credit to the lawmakers who passed—and the 
President who signed—the spending measure. 
 Subject to these assumptions, the model generates a first-cut solution to the 
puzzle in Part I. The President will include a proposal in the Greenbook if pB > 
pC, which is to say, when B > C. In other words, the President will include a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300 On political ignorance, see generally Michael X. Delli Carpini & Scott Keeter, What 
Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters (1996); Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and 
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional 
Theory, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1287 (2004). For example, only 55% of U.S. adults (though perhaps a 
higher percentage of voters) knew that Republicans had a majority in the House of Representatives 
before the 2000 election. See Somin, supra, at 1308 tbl.1.  
301 See, e.g., Alec MacGillis, The Billionaire’s Loophole, New Yorker, Mar. 14, 2016, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/14/david-rubenstein-and-the-carried-interest-
dilemma; Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Private Equity & Investment Firms, OpenSecrets.org, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?ind=F2600 (last visited Mar. 11, 2016). 
302 See, e.g., Kevin Drawbaugh & Andy Sullivan, Insight: How Treasury’s Tax Loophole Mistake 
Saves Companies Billions Each Year, Reuters, May 20, 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tax-checkthebox-insight-idUSBRE94T17K20130531. 
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revenue-raising proposal in the Greenbook if the political benefits from additional 
spending (benefits he shares with Congress) offset the political costs from 
additional taxation (costs he also shares with Congress). By contrast, the President 
will act unilaterally to raise revenue only if pB > C—only if the shared political 
benefits from additional spending offset the political costs from additional taxation 
that the President must bear on his own. This suggests that there exists a set of 
revenue-raising proposals that the President is willing to include in the Greenbook 
but unwilling to pursue on his own: those for which pC < pB < C. 
 With respect to revenue-reducing measures, the model generates an 
opposite result. Assume that voters appreciate actions that reduce their own tax 
burden; the only political cost of such measures is that they leave less revenue to 
be spent. If the President acts unilaterally to reduce revenue, the political benefits, 
B, are all his, and the political costs of corresponding spending cuts are shared 
with Congress. This suggests that there exists a set of revenue-reducing measures 
that the President would be willing to enact on his own but not if he has to share 
the credit with Congress: those for which pB < pC < B. 
 One might think that the dynamics of tax lawmaking would change as a 
President approaches the end of his second term in office. And indeed, the 
Treasury Department issued a series of revenue-raising “midnight regulations” in 
the last days before President Clinton left the White House. These midnight 
regulations included: regulations placing limits on the availability of the research 
and experimentation tax credit 303  (which were then suspended by the 
administration of George W. Bush after it took office304); regulations designed to 
prevent avoidance of rules regarding long-term contracts;305 regulations aimed at 
stopping “abusive transactions” involving charitable remainder trusts; 306 
regulations extending an anti-abuse rule to rental agreements involving payments 
of $2 million or less;307 and regulations restricting the permissible terms for 
lifetime charitable lead trusts.308 Even so, there are reasons why a President might 
be reluctant to act in his waning days in office. For one, an outgoing President will 
not be around to share in the political benefits from additional spending; thus, 
both terms in the President’s cost-benefit calculus are reduced in the 
administration’s last days. And perhaps more significantly, a President who is 
being followed by a member of the opposite party may worry that midnight 
revenue-raising regulations will allow his successor to score easy political points: 
the successor can rescind or suspend the midnight regulation (as President Bush 
did with respect to Clinton’s R&E rule) and reap all the political benefits that 
follow. 
 As of this writing, voters had yet to go to the polls for the 2016 general 
election, and the results of the presidential race were (of course) unknown. Yet as 
noted above, the smart money was on the President’s party retaining the White 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 66 Fed. Reg. 280 (Jan. 3, 2001). 
304 See, e.g., Robert McIntyre, The Taxonomist, Am. Prospect, Jan. 3, 2002, 
http://prospect.org/article/taxonomist-36. 
305 66 Fed. Reg. 2219 (Jan. 11, 2001). 
306 66 Fed. Reg. 1034 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
307 66 Fed. Reg. 1038 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
308 66 Fed. Reg. 1040 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
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House,309 rendering the latter concern somewhat less salient. Perhaps the Obama 
administration’s more robust exercise of executive authority in a revenue-raising 
direction in mid-2016 can be attributed to this political reality: the administration 
might have been clearing the regulatory brush so that the next Democratic 
President could avoid the political costs of doing so. It should be emphasized, 
however, that at no prior point in the modern era has a President who generally 
supported higher taxes handed off power to a successor of the same political 
party.310 Drawing any inferences about such a handover from President Obama’s 
last year in office raises the risk of overextrapolating based on an n of 1.311 
 Even though the model above is only rudimentary, it already sheds some 
light on the puzzle in Part I. On the one hand, the President may be willing to 
include revenue-raising proposals in the Greenbook but not to implement those 
proposals unilaterally because the political costs are too steep if he must bear those 
costs all on his own. On the other hand, the President may be quite willing to 
pursue revenue-reducing measures on his own: indeed, in some circumstances he 
may be willing to implement revenue-reducing measures via executive action even 
though he would not want the measure included in the Greenbook. Notably, the 
simple model does not suggest that the set of revenue-raising executive actions will 
be null: the President still may be willing to act on his own when pB > C. But 
while the basic model sheds light on the President’s incentives, it fails to capture 
the strategic interactions between the President and Congress. The next 
subsection takes up that task. 
 
2. The Strategic Model 
 
 With respect to revenue-raising measures, the model has identified a set of 
proposals that the President will choose to include in the Greenbook but is not 
willing to implement on his own. Yet the President’s decision to include a proposal 
in the Greenbook is not the end of the story; it is his opening bid in bargaining 
with Congress. According to the model, the President will include a proposal in 
the Greenbook if pC < pB < C, and will not include a proposal in the Greenbook if 
B < C. When pB > C, though, the analysis is more complicated.  
 The complication arises from the fact that even if pB > C, it is still the case 
that C > pC. In other words, even if the shared political benefits of additional 
spending are high enough that the President would be willing to bear the political 
costs of raising revenue on his own, he would still prefer to share those costs with 
Congress. As a result, the President may include proposals in the Greenbook even 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309 See supra note 233. 
310 The last time a living Democratic President handed off power to a Democratic successor was in 
1857, before there was a federal income tax. Republican President William Howard Taft 
supported the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment and Republican President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower held views about taxation that would be anathema to Republicans today, but both 
were succeeded by Presidents of the rival party.  
311 On midnight rulemaking generally, see Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of 
Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 Va. L. Rev. 889 
(2008). O’Connell finds a significant uptick in rulemaking activity in a President’s final year in 
office, see id. at 956 tbl.4, although it is difficult to know whether this is because the incentives of 
regulators shift in the final year, or because outgoing administration officials are racing to complete 
multiyear projects before they leave office. 
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though—if the prospect of legislation were off the table—the President would be 
willing to implement the proposal via executive action. 
 After Congress receives the Greenbook, it decides whether to adopt the 
President’s proposal. (Of course, just as the Executive Branch is not a unitary 
actor, Congress is not of one mind either; for now, imagine a unified congressional 
leadership calling the legislative shots, though this assumption will be relaxed later 
on.) One might think that if the leadership in Congress shares the President’s 
preferences (or shares his estimate of political costs and benefits), then Congress 
would adopt every proposal in the Greenbook. The outcome might change, 
though, if the leaders of Congress have political fortunes separate from the 
President. This is because the congressional leadership knows that the President 
may include some proposals in the Greenbook for which pB > C. (With perfect 
information, the leaders of Congress will be able to identify the proposals that fall 
into this set.) While the President would prefer to share political costs with 
Congress, the leaders of Congress would prefer that the President bear those costs 
himself. 
 How might we imagine this interaction playing out? The payoffs to the 
President and Congress resemble the well-known “hawk-dove” game.312 If the 
President does not regulate and Congress does not legislate, then the payoff is zero 
to both sides. If the President does not regulate and Congress does legislate, then 
the payoff to the President is p(B – C) and the payoff to Congress is (1 – p)(B – C). 
In other words, the President and Congress share both the benefits and the costs. 
And if the President regulates while Congress does not legislate, then the payoff to 
the President is pB – C while the payoff to Congress is (1 – p)B. That is, the 
President and Congress share the benefits, but the President bears all the costs. 
Figure 1 summarizes the analysis thus far. Note that the model excludes the 
possibility of unilateral congressional action: my assumption is that the President 
will never veto a revenue-raising proposal that he already has included in his own 
Greenbook. (Indeed, there do not appear to be any historical examples of such a 
veto.) 
 
Figure 1.  Hawk-Dove Game With One Missing Box 
 
 Don’t Legislate Legislate 
Don’t Regulate 0, 0 pB - pC, (1 - p)(B - C) 
Regulate pB - C, (1 - p)B -- 
 
 Three points about Figure 1 are worth noting. First, the upper left box 
(don’t regulate, don’t legislate) is the worst of all worlds for both players. The President 
would prefer to regulate than to end up in the upper left box, even though that 
means he would bear all the political costs of revenue raising himself. And 
Congress, for its part, would prefer to legislate than to end up in the upper left 
box, even though that would mean it shares a portion of the political costs. 
Second, the President would prefer to end up in the upper right box (don’t regulate, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
312 See Douglas C. Baird, Robert H. Gertner & Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and the Law __ 
(1994); Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and 
Law, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 209, 223-24 (2009). 
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legislate) rather than the lower left box (regulate, don’t legislate). This should track our 
intuitions: the President wants to share the political costs of revenue raising with 
Congress if he can. Third, and reciprocally, Congress would prefer to end up in 
the lower left box (regulate, don’t legislate) rather than the upper right box (don’t 
regulate, legislate). Again, this should be intuitive: Congress would prefer for the 
President to bear all the political costs of revenue raising rather than having those 
costs shared across branches. 
 What goes in the fourth box? What would it mean for the President to 
regulate and Congress to legislate? In theory, Congress could ratify a Treasury 
regulation by incorporating the regulatory language into a statute. However, once 
the Treasury Department has already promulgated a revenue-raising regulation, 
what incentive would Congress have to incur the political costs that come with 
codification (given that Congress is already set to share the benefits from the 
revenue raised)? Perhaps a more plausible interpretation of the fourth box is as 
follows: When the President includes a proposal in the Greenbook, the President 
decides whether he is willing to proceed unilaterally and Congress decides 
whether it is willing to proceed legislatively. If the President decides to regulate 
and Congress decides to legislate, then the outcome is a tossup as to who acts first. 
The simplest representation of the tossup is to say that half the time the President 
acts first and half the time Congress acts first. The payoffs in the lower right box, 
then, are the averages of the payoffs in the upper right and lower left boxes. Thus 
when the President decides to regulate and Congress decides to legislate, there is a 
50% probability that the President will regulate first—in which case Congress 
won’t legislate, the President’s payoff will be pB – C, and Congress’s payoff will be 
(1 – p)B. Likewise, there is a 50% probability that Congress will legislate first—in 
which case the President won’t regulate, his payoff will be p(B – C), and 
Congress’s payoff will be (1 – p)(B – C). The terms in the lower right box in Figure 
2 represent the averages of these payoffs. 
 
Figure 2.  Hawk-Dove Game With All Four Boxes Filled In 
 
 Don’t Legislate Legislate 
Don’t Regulate 0, 0 pB – pC, (1 – p)(B – C) 
Regulate pB – C, (1 – p)B pB – 0.5C – 0.5pC, 
B – pB – 0.5C + 0.5pC 
  
 A game has a Nash equilibrium when there exists a set of strategies such 
that each player’s strategy is an optimal response to the other player’s strategy.313 
(The name honors John Forbes Nash, Jr., the mathematician and Nobel prize 
winner of A Beautiful Mind fame.314) Here, the lower left and upper right boxes 
both represent Nash equilibria. In the lower left box, Congress never legislates 
and the President always regulates. (More precisely, the President unilaterally 
implements revenue-raising measures allowable under existing statutes for which 
pB > C.) Conditional on Congress not legislating, the President has no incentive to 
change his strategy because his payoff from (regulate, don’t legislate) is higher than his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 See Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, Game Theory 11 (1991). 
314 See Sylvia Nasar, A Beautiful Mind (1998); A Beautiful Mind (Imagine Entertainment 2001). 
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payoff from (don’t regulate, don’t legislate). And conditional on the President 
regulating, Congress has no incentive to change its strategy because its payoff is 
higher when it does not legislate than when it does. Likewise, in the upper right 
box, the President never regulates and Congress always legislates. Again, the 
President has no incentive to change his strategy as long as Congress sticks to 
legislating, and Congress has no incentive to change its strategy as long as the 
President does not regulate. Both of these equilibria are considered “pure 
strategy” equilibria because they involve each player playing the same strategy 
each time.315 
 We can imagine, then, a lower-left-box world in which Congress never 
adopts any revenue-raising measure for which pB > C, and the President always 
proceeds unilaterally. We can also imagine an upper-right-box world in which 
Congress always adopts such measures and the President never proceeds on his 
own. Note that in either case, the President never moves unilaterally to adopt a 
measure for which pB < C; if the shared benefits from additional spending are less 
than the costs of acting alone, the President will not act alone.  
 Even readers unfamiliar with game theory will likely have an intuition at 
this point that the two pure strategy Nash equilibria are not the only possible 
outcomes of the hawk-dove game: the players might mix up their moves from 
time to time. And indeed, game theory shows that the players can arrive at a 
mixed strategy equilibrium as well. The mixed strategy equilibrium arises when 
the President’s combination of moves makes Congress indifferent between 
legislating and not legislating, and Congress’s combination of moves makes the 
President indifferent between regulating and not regulating. Formally, let r 
represent the probability that the President will regulate and let λ (the Greek letter 
lambda) represent the probability that Congress will legislate; a mixed strategy 
equilibrium arises when316: 
 
r  =      B – C 
  B – 0.5C 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315 See Baird et al., supra note 312, at 313. 
316 The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium arises in the hawk-dove game where both players are 
indifferent between their two strategies.  The condition for Congress to be indifferent between don’t 
legislate and legislate is: 
 
0(1 - r) + [(1 - p)B]r = [(1 - p)(B – C)](1 - r) + [B – pB -  0.5C + 0.5pC]r 
 
This equation can be solved for r with the result that: 
 
r = (B - C)/(B - 0.5C) 
 
The condition for the President to be indifferent between don’t regulate and regulate is: 
 
0(1 - λ) + (pB - pC)λ = (pB - C)(1 - λ) + (pB - 0.5C - 0.5pC)λ 
 
This equation can be solved for λ with the result that: 
 
λ = (pB - C)/(pB - 0.5pC - 0.5C) 
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and 
λ  =   pB – C 
    pB – 0.5C – 0.5pC 
 
 What does this mean practically? The answer depends critically on the 
values of the unknown variables. Say, for example, that p = 0.5, B = 2.01, and C = 
1. That is, the President and Congress share the political benefits and costs of joint 
action evenly, and the political costs of raising revenue are slightly less than half 
the political benefits of the spending that it enables. We can imagine the President 
and Congress interacting repeatedly with respect to revenue-raising measures that 
the President would be willing to adopt if the prospect of legislative action were off 
the table and that Congress would be willing to enact if the prospect of executive 
action were foreclosed. Given the parameter values above, the mixed strategy 
Nash equilibrium looks like the following: in about 66% of cases, the President 
ends up regulating on his own; in 1% of cases, Congress enacts the measure via 
legislation; and in the remaining cases (slightly less than one-third), neither side acts 
and the measure goes unimplemented.317 
 Given that the values of p, B, and C are all unknown, it would be a mistake 
to place too much emphasis on any particular percentage figure. The more 
important point is this: Two-sided inaction may result in the hawk-dove game 
even in equilibrium. Combining this insight with the results of the simple model at 
the beginning of the section, we now have two explanations for the puzzle 
presented in Part I. Even when the President already has authority under existing 
statutes to implement some of his Greenbook proposals via unilateral action, the 
President may fail to do so because: 
 
• The President’s share of the political benefits from the spending that the 
revenue raising will allow is greater than the political costs of revenue 
raising if those costs can be shared, but less than the political costs of 
revenue raising if he must bear all of those costs himself (pC < pB < C); or 
 
• The President’s share of the political benefits from the spending that 
revenue raising will allow is greater than the political costs of revenue 
raising even if he must bear all of those costs himself (pB > C), but two-
sided inaction is sometimes the result of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium 
solution to the game played by the President and Congress.318 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 When p = 0.5, B = 2.01, and C = 1, then r = 0.669 (66.9%) and λ = 0.020 (2.0%). Thus, in 
32.44% of cases the outcome is (don’t regulate, don’t legislate); in 0.66% of cases the outcome is (don’t 
regulate, legislate); in 65.56% of cases the outcome is (regulate, don’t legislate), and in 1.34% of cases the 
outcome is (regulate, legislate). When the President decides to regulate and Congress decides to 
legislate, it is a tossup a to who acts first: half of the 1.34% of cases end up as cases of unilateral 
executive action, and half of the 1.34% of cases end up with legislation.    
318 We can derive additional insights through comparative statics. Note that the (don’t regulate, don’t 
legislate) outcome arises with probability (1 – r)(1 – λ). Substituting the values for r and λ derived 
above, we arrive at: 
 
                  0.25C2 (1 – p)       
pB2 – 0.5BC – pBC + 0.25C2 + 0.25pC2 
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3.  Further Implications of the Hawk-Dove Model 
 
 So far the model has made no accommodation for ideology: it assumes 
that the President and Congress have the same ideal point with respect to 
legislation. The model also has not addressed the role of doctrine in constraining 
or enabling executive action. Incorporating ideology and doctrine into the model 
yields additional insights into the dynamics of tax lawmaking. 
 
a. The Role of Ideology 
 
 What if the President and Congress assign different values to B and C? 
Such a scenario is likely in an era of divided government if one party’s political 
base has a stronger taste for spending (or distaste for taxation) than the other’s. 
 Begin with the case in which the President assigns a lower value to B (or a 
higher value to C) than Congress does. This means that for some set of potential 
proposals, B > C from Congress’s perspective but B < C  from the President’s point 
of view. In other words, Congress would pass a revenue-raising measure but the 
President would not include it in the Greenbook or sign it into law. Revenue-
raising measures of this sort will not be implemented. 
 At the same time, the difference between the President’s and Congress’s 
cost-benefit assessments also reduces the frequency with which pB > C. There are 
fewer revenue-raising proposals that the President would be willing to implement 
on his own. This narrows the range over which interactions between the President 
and Congress resembles the hawk-dove game. Knowing that the tax-averse 
President is unlikely to act on his own, Congress is more likely to adopt a strategy 
of legislation.  
 This analysis suggests that tax aversion on the part of the President or his 
political base has an ambiguous effect on the probability that revenue-raising 
legislation will be enacted. On the one hand, the President’s tax aversion makes 
him less likely to include revenue-raising measures in his Greenbook (or to sign 
such measures into law). On the other hand, Congress—knowing that the 
President is tax-averse—is less likely to believe that he would be willing to 
implement revenue-raising measures on his own. In sum, the President’s tax 
aversion reduces the number of revenue-raising proposals that the President will 
include in the Greenbook but increases the probability that Congress will enact 
any given revenue-raising measure that the President does include in the 
Greenbook. 
 The reverse scenario is potentially more interesting, as it more closely 
describes the present state of affairs in Washington. In this scenario, for a wide 
range of revenue-raising measures, B > C from the President’s perspective but B < 
C from Congress’s vantage point. This scenario would come about if, say, the 
political costs of revenue-raising measures are very high for the congressional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
So long as pB > C, the probability of a (don’t regulate, don’t legislate) result decreases over B, increases 
over C, and decreases over p. In other words, the probability of a (don’t regulate, don’t legislate) result is 
highest when the political costs of raising revenue are high relative to the political benefits and the 
President captures a relatively small share of the benefits. 
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leadership because of a strong anti-tax faction within the majority party. 
Congressional tax aversion will, unsurprisingly, make it less likely that any 
revenue-raising legislation will be passed. Yet that fact may make the President 
more likely to act unilaterally when pB > C. Recall that in the hawk-dove game, 
the President had an incentive to seek congressional support even for proposals 
that he would be willing to implement on his own absent the possibility of 
legislation. In effect, congressional tax aversion removes the possibility of 
legislation. 
 A perhaps-ironic implication of this analysis is that the rise of the anti-tax 
Tea Party in recent years may actually lead to more revenue being raised. This is 
because a President who knows that he cannot get any revenue-raising measure 
through Congress will implement such measures on his own whenever pB > C. 
The Tea Party, in other words, allows the President and Congress to avoid the 
uncooperative result (don’t regulate, don’t legislate) in the hawk-dove game. 
 
b. The Role of Doctrine 
 
 The analysis above assumed that the President has the legal option of 
implementing revenue-raising measures via executive action. The availability of 
this option, however, depends on the deference regime. The option may be off the 
table under a less deferential regime (e.g., National Muffler) but available under a 
more deferential regime (Chevron). 
 One might initially expect that the shift to a more deferential regime 
would generally have positive revenue effects. This might be so if taxpayer-
friendly regulations are likely to go unchallenged while taxpayer-unfriendly 
regulations are likely to be litigated. In the latter set of cases (the only cases that 
will make it to court in substantial numbers), more deference means it is more 
likely that the IRS will prevail. Yet the analysis changes when one considers the 
dynamic effects of deference regimes on the shape of tax law. Recall the 
observation in section II.B that when pB  > C, an uncooperative outcome (don’t 
regulate, don’t legislate) is possible unless the President can credibly commit not to 
regulate or Congress can credibly commit not to legislate. A zero-deference 
regime would effectively eliminate the President’s regulatory option, increasing 
the probability that Congress would act. 
 None of this is to say that a less deferential regime always results in more 
revenue. The static and dynamic effects of deference cut in different directions: 
deference makes it more likely that any particular Treasury regulation will pass 
judicial muster but less likely that Congress will act to raise revenues. What we 
can say is that the Supreme Court’s shift from National Muffler to Chevron will not 
necessarily have a positive effect on revenue, because freedom of action for the 
Executive Branch may lead to inaction by Congress. 
 
B.  The Role of Deficit Hawks 
 
 So far the model has assumed an equality of revenues and expenditures: 
the possibility of deficit spending has not yet entered the picture. Incorporating 
the possibility of deficit spending generates additional insights—one of which 
might strike some readers as quite counterintuitive. 
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 One way to conceptualize deficit spending is to think of it as just another 
form of taxation. Deficits impose a cost on future taxpayers, at least some of 
whom are also current voters (i.e., the relatively young).319 Deficits are also 
sometimes said to impose a cost on savers through inflation, though there are 
strong theoretical reasons to doubt this claim320 and little empirical evidence to 
support it.321 Lawmakers and Presidents who support deficit-financed projects 
capture political benefits on the spending side but bear political costs from voters 
and interest groups adversely affected by deficits. 
 What happens if “deficit hawks” constitute a well-organized interest 
group?322 (I do not intend the term “deficit hawk” to be pejorative in any sense—
politicians seem to embrace the label readily.323) One possibility is that a President 
can implement a revenue-raising measure via regulation and advertise the fact 
that the measure will lower the deficit: presumably deficit hawks will give all the 
political credit for the deficit reduction to the President. On the other hand, a 
President may be reluctant to take this approach because it will also serve to 
underscore his responsibility for the measure in the minds of adversely affected 
taxpayers. Perhaps unsurprisingly, I have found no example of a President 
implementing a revenue-raising reform via regulation and then publicizing it as a 
deficit-reduction measure. 
 The existence of deficit hawks may affect the dynamics of tax lawmaking 
through another channel. In 1990, Congress adopted the so-called “PAYGO” 
rule requiring that any spending that increases the deficit must be offset by 
measures that raise revenue or reduce other spending by at least the same 
amount.324 The PAYGO law lapsed from 2002 until 2010, and while a version of 
PAYGO was reenacted in 2010, the new law applies only to tax cuts and 
entitlement spending (not to the “discretionary” items—such as defense, 
education, and transportation, economic development—that together make up 
32% of the federal budget).325 PAYGO is not a binding constraint: Congress can 
turn it off for any bill at any time (as it did for the December 2015 package of tax 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319 See David Romer, What Are the Costs of Excessive Deficits?, 3 NBER Macroeconomics 
Annual 63 (1988). 
320 See, e.g., Robert J. Barro, The Ricardian Approach to Budget Deficits, 3 J. Econ. Perspectives 
37 (1989). 
321 See, e.g., Marco Bassetto & R. Andrew Butters, What Is the Relationship Between Large 
Deficits and Inflation in Industrialized Countries?, Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi. Economic 
Perspectives—3rd Quarter 83 (2010). 
322 The scenario is not entirely hypothetical: Blackstone Group co-founder Peter Peterson has 
spent more than a half billion dollars over the last several years in an effort to draw political 
attention to debt/deficit concerns. See Alan Feuer, Peter G. Peterson’s Last Anti-Debt Crusade, 
Apr. 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/10/nyregion/10peterson.html. 
323 See, e.g., Ron Klein, Op-Ed, Fiscal Responsibility Begins in Washington, Sun-Sentinel (Ft. 
Lauderdale, Fla.), Feb. 25, 2010, at 14A (then-sitting Democratic congressman telling voters in his 
district that “[t]hose who know me know that I am a deficit hawk”). 
324 See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax 
Legislative Process, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 501, 510 (1998). 
325 See Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-139, 124 Stat. 8; Ctr. for Budget & 
Policy Priorities, Policy Basics: Introduction to the Federal Budget, 
http://www.cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-introduction-to-the-federal-budget-process (last 
updated Feb. 17, 2016). 
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breaks that will add $622 billion to the national debt).326 And yet bills that violate 
revenue neutrality tend to generate at least some political blowback—especially 
from fiscally conservative members of the Republican caucus.327 So while the 
requirement of revenue neutrality exists only on paper, it remains the case that 
ceteris paribus, members of Congress (or at least some of them) would be more 
inclined to vote for legislation that is revenue neutral than legislation that is deficit 
increasing. 
 Why might this matter to the President when considering whether to 
implement revenue-raising measures unilaterally? One possibility is that 
Presidents will “save up” revenue-raising measures for future negotiations with 
Congress regarding the budget. Administration officials might realize that they 
could raise revenues by nearly $10 billion over the next decade through 
regulations preventing dual-capacity taxpayers from claiming foreign tax credits 
where the relevant foreign country imposes no general corporate income tax,328 
but might decide that those $10 billion also could be used to (partially) offset the 
cost of a tax break or spending provision that the President favors. And if the 
Executive Branch adopts the revenue-raising measure unilaterally now, it loses the 
ability to use the measure as a chip when bargaining with deficit hawks in 
Congress down the line. The irony is that congressional deficit hawks—because 
they are less willing to support measures that add to the deficit—may deter the 
President from taking steps that would raise revenue and reduce the deficit. 
PAYGO may be a double-edged sword. 
 One possible solution would be to amend the PAYGO law so as to require 
the Executive Branch to keep a running tally of revenues raised through 
regulatory action, and then to allow those revenues to be used as an offset the next 
time Congress passes deficit-increasing legislation. Yet if the objective is overall 
deficit reduction, it is not clear whether such a reform would bring the budget 
closer in line with that goal. After all, the analysis in Section II.A does not suggest 
that the number of revenue-raising regulations will be zero: a pure strategy 
equilibrium of (regulate, don’t legislate) is possible and a mixed strategy equilibrium in 
which the President sometimes acts unilaterally is also possible. And while the 
analysis in this section suggests that the norm of revenue neutrality may sometimes 
deter the President from acting on his own, it does not suggest that the shadow of 
PAYGO will always have that effect. Allowing for the use of revenues raised by 
regulation as part of the PAYGO calculus might motivate the President to act 
unilaterally in some instances that he otherwise might not, but in other instances 
the President might have acted even in the absence of the proposed PAYGO 
reform. If, for example, the President would have implemented the foreign tax 
credit measure that raises revenue by $10 billion regardless of PAYGO, then 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326 See Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 1001 (Dec. 18, 
2015); David M. Herszenhorn, Under Wire, House Passes Big Package of Tax Cuts, N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 17, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/18/us/politics/house-approves-huge-package-
of-tax-breaks.html; Mark Bloomfield, Tax Extenders on the Road to Tax Reform, The Hill (Dec. 
21, 2015), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/economy-budget/263889-tax-extenders-on-the-
road-to-tax-reform. 
327 See Rachel Bade, Congress’s Half-Trillion-Dollar Spending Binge, Politico (Dec. 17, 2015), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/12/congress-spending-binge-tax-cuts-budget-deal-216883. 
328 See supra Section I.E.4. 
July-8-2016              DRAFT—PRESIDENT’S POWER TO TAX 
	  
61 
allowing those $10 billion to offset other tax cuts or direct spending would simply 
serve to loosen the PAYGO constraint. 
 The takeaway, then, is not that PAYGO is a bad idea or that it ought to be 
amended. Rather, the implication is that norms of revenue neutrality in Congress 
(binding or not) may have an as-yet-unrecognized effect on the President’s 
incentives to act unilaterally. 329 So while the analysis here does not yield a 
concrete proposal with respect to revenue neutrality requirements, it does serve to 
shed light on one of PAYGO’s hidden costs.    
 
C.  Cheap Talk 
 
 So far, the analysis in this part has assumed that the Greenbooks reflect 
the genuine preferences of the President. The very question “why doesn’t the 
President use his power to accomplish X?” assumes that X is an outcome that the 
President desires. That assumption is arguably naïve: perhaps Treasury officials 
place proposals in the Greenbook with no intention that those proposals will ever 
come to fruition. 
 Yet if this is so, it is difficult to explain what exactly the Executive Branch 
gets out of putting a proposal in the Greenbook. Perhaps it is a way of mollifying 
progressives or deficit hawks without incurring the wrath of interest groups with a 
stake in the status quo. But for that strategy to work, it would require (1) that pro-
tax constituencies are sophisticated enough to be paying attention to the 
Greenbook while (2) not being so sophisticated as to understand that the 
Greenbook is cheap talk, while at the same time (3) the interest groups with a 
stake in the status quo are sufficiently sophisticated to understand that Greenbook 
talk is cheap. This confluence of conditions is perhaps conceivable, but not 
particularly plausible. 
 Another sense in which Greenbook proposals might be “cheap talk” is that 
they are relatively cheap to write. That is, the time and resource costs borne by 
Treasury and IRS officials are likely lower with respect to Greenbook proposals 
than with respect to regulations that have the force of law. Since Greenbook 
proposals are only proposals, the language does not have to be airtight. And 
Treasury need not go through notice and comment or observe other procedural 
niceties with respect to the Greenbook each year.330 But while Greenbook talk is 
no doubt cheaper than regulation writing, the costs of the latter are not 
prohibitive. When a policy goal becomes a top presidential priority, the Executive 
Branch is capable of acting expeditiously.331 None of this is to deny that resource 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329 For an example of a recent discussion of PAYGO that ignores this potential unintended 
consequence of the law, see Nancy Pelosi, Op-Ed, Shouldn’t Congress Tell Us How We’ll Pay for 
Tax Cuts?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/opinion/shouldnt-congress-tell-us-how-well-pay-for-tax-
cuts.html. 
330 To be sure, legislative drafting requires resources as well. But those costs potentially can be 
passed off to Hill staffers at the relevant congressional committees—the House Ways and Means 
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, as well as the lawyers at the Joint Committee on 
Taxation and the House and Senate Offices of the Legislative Counsel who assist members of 
Congress in drafting statutes. 
331 See, e.g., Elizabeth Kolbert, Midnight Hour, New Yorker, Nov. 24, 2008, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/11/24/midnight-hour. 
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constraints play a very real role in the day-to-day operations of the Treasury 
Department. But it is to suggest that resource constraints are endogenous to the 
political dynamics of tax lawmaking.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 So far, this article has argued that the President’s “power to tax” under 
existing statutes is broad, but that notwithstanding this power, the President 
repeatedly asks Congress to pass revenue-raising measures that he and his 
Treasury Secretary could implement on their own. This article has presented 
several plausible explanations for presidential inaction in tax law. These accounts 
do not, however, tell us whether the President ought to assert executive authority 
more robustly in the tax domain. 
 The observations above do shed some light on a separate normative 
question: whether Congress ought to give the President some authority to set tax 
rates. In a recent article, James Hines and Kyle Logue suggest that delegation of 
rate-setting authority “might be normatively attractive.” 332  The Hines-Logue 
argument for delegation of rate-setting authority resembles arguments for 
delegation in other areas of law: agencies “have comparative advantages” relative 
to Congress “in terms of expertise and time”;333 delegation gives agencies greater 
“flexibility” to respond to changes in the legal environment and the economy;334 
and “the President answers to a majority of the electorate in a way that no single 
legislator or even group of legislators does.”335 The analysis in Section II.A 
suggests, though, that delegation in the tax context might have different results 
than in other domains. Interest group politics push the President to exercise 
executive power over tax law largely in one direction: in favor of the taxpayer. 
That result may appear to be positive or negative depending on one’s ideological 
commitments; at the very least, it makes us doubt whether a President with even 
broader delegated authority over tax law would act as a faithful agent of his 
congressional principals.  
 Congress, then, might be well advised to resist calls for delegation of rate-
setting authority to the President. This does not mean, though, that the President 
ought to refrain from exercising the authority that Congress already has 
delegated. As a normative matter, it is difficult to see why the President ought to 
be any less willing to exercise his statutory authority in tax law than in other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332 See James R. Hines Jr. & Kyle D. Logue, Delegating Tax, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 235 (2015). Hines 
and Logue cite work by political scientists David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran suggesting that 
Congress is less likely to delegate power to the President in the tax content than in other policy 
areas. See id. at 237 (citing David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A 
Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers 196-203 tbl.8.2 
(1999)). Note, though, that Epstein and O’Halloran’s results are based on the percentage of public 
law provisions in particular areas that delegate discretion to the Executive. Results for tax may be 
skewed by the fact that a single provision, section 7805, authorizes the Treasury Secretary to 
“prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of [the Internal Revenue Code].” 
26 U.S.C. § 7805(a).  
333 Hines & Logue, supra note 332, at 261. 
334 Id. 
335 Id.; cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 
1 J. L. Econ. & Org. 81 (1985) (making similar arguments in the non-tax context).  
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domains. Indeed, lawmakers likely would prefer for the President to exercise that 
authority—and to do so in a revenue-raising direction, so that Congress can share 
in the political rewards from spending without sharing the political costs of raising 
revenue. Moreover, the fact that Congress has failed to act on a proposal in the 
Greenbook does not imply congressional disapproval of the proposal. It may 
mean, to the contrary, that members of Congress want the President to implement 
those policies himself.  
 Finally, the analysis in this article identifies two features of the political 
environment that decrease the likelihood of unilateral executive action to raise 
revenue: (1) revenue-raising actions rarely yield political benefits except insofar as 
they facilitate additional spending; and (2) members of Congress are more likely to 
support legislation if it is scored as revenue neutral. The first factor reduces the 
President’s willingness to act when that means he will bear the political costs of 
revenue raising on his own; the second factor encourages the President to “save 
up” revenue-raising measures so that they can be used as offsets for future 
expenditures or tax cuts that he supports. Neither factor is necessarily a 
permanent feature of the political landscape.  
 As for the first factor, 63% of respondents in a recent Gallup poll said that 
wealth in the United States should be more evenly distributed, and 52% 
supported heavy taxes on the rich as a redistributive mechanism.336 We may be 
nearing a time when a President can score political points through revenue-raising 
regulations that disproportionately affect large corporations and wealthy 
taxpayers. As for the second factor, concern about the deficit appears to be on the 
decline—both among members of the public and in the halls of Congress. Only 
11% of respondents in a recent Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll ranked the 
deficit as a “top priority,” down from 22% four years earlier.337 Other surveys 
identify a similar trend.338 And a tax deal that flunked the revenue neutrality test 
by a $622 billion margin nonetheless passed the House and Senate with large 
bipartisan majorities at the end of 2015.339 If lawmakers are unconcerned with 
revenue neutrality, then the President has less of an incentive to save up revenue-
raising measures for future bargaining with Congress. And if legislative gridlock 
makes any entitlement expansion or sweeping tax reform package unlikely, then 
the President has even less reason to save up revenue-raising measures for future 
bargaining with Congress because such bargaining is unlikely to bear fruit 
anyway. 
 These trends help us make sense of the Obama administration’s April 
2016 actions on corporate inversions. The simplifying assumption in the game-
theoretic model is that the only political benefit from revenue-raising tax measures 
comes through the expenditures enabled by additional revenue, but that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336 Frank Newport, Americans Continue to Say U.S. Wealth Distribution Is Unfair, Gallup (May 
4, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/182987/americans-continue-say-wealth-distribution-
unfair.aspx. 
337 See Janet Hook, Deficit Concern Fades in Congress, Among Voters and on the 2016 Trail, 
Wall St. J., Dec. 22, 2015, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/12/22/deficit-concern-fades-in-
congress-among-voters-and-on-the-2016-trail. 
338 See, e.g., Budget Deficit Slips as Public Priority, Pew Research Ctr., Jan. 22, 2016, 
http://www.people-press.org/2016/01/22/budget-deficit-slips-as-public-priority. 
339 See Hook, supra note 339. 
July-8-2016              DRAFT—PRESIDENT’S POWER TO TAX 
	  
64 
simplifying assumption probably does not hold true for the inversions case. 
Cracking down on U.S. corporations that seek to lower their tax bills by merging 
with foreign counterparts quite likely would be a politically popular endeavor,340 
even if the Treasury Department burned the additional cash generated by its 
actions. This is not necessarily a problem with the model as much as an additional 
implication: Presidents will be more willing to take revenue-raising actions 
unilaterally when those actions yield political benefits over and above the political 
benefits from spending.  
 The inversions case is consistent with the comparative statics in Part II in 
still other ways. Conditions that make executive action more likely are present 
with respect to inversions. The congressional leadership is constrained by an anti-
tax faction, which effectively rules out the (don’t regulate, legislate) option. In those 
circumstances, regulation becomes the President’s dominant strategy. Meanwhile, 
the low probability of election year tax reform means that the PAYGO deterrent 
is largely absent today: there are no significant entitlement expansions or tax cuts 
on the horizon that the Obama administration might want to offset. Perhaps it 
should not be surprising, then, that the President and his Treasury Secretary 
chose this time and this issue for unilateral action. 
 Does April 2016 mark a turning point in the politics of taxation? The fact 
that the April 2016 actions were followed by proposed rules on FLPs four months 
later might suggest so: as voters become more concerned about inequality and less 
so about the deficit, the political calculus with respect to revenue-raising tax 
regulations may change. Or the Obama administration’s last-year actions might 
suggest a fleeting confluence of circumstances—a second-term President likely to 
be succeeded by a political ally and facing an opposition party in Congress whose 
members can credibly commit the party leadership not to pass revenue-raising 
measures. “Prediction is difficult, especially about the future.”341 What does seem 
evident, though, is that if a future President decides to exercise the full range of his 
(or her) power to tax under existing statutes, he or she will find that long-latent 
power to be vast indeed. 
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